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ERISA: STATE REGULATION
OF INSURED PLANS AFTER DAVILA
DONALD T. BoGAN*

Consumers who receive their health care benefits or disability
benefits through their employment often endure significant legal
obstacles in enforcing benefit claims, in addition to suffering the
medical hardships which may underlie those claims. ERISA, enacted by Congress in 1974 to reform the private pension industry,
also impacts non-pension employee fringe benefit programs, including health care benefit plans and disability benefit plans. Federal
courts have interpreted ERISA to preempt traditional state law
consequential and punitive damage remedies in claims arising
from employment-provided fringe benefit plans, without substituting any comparablefederal remedies. Additionally, under the guise
of deferential review, federal courts have created a system of summary adjudicationin employee benefit claims that routinely denies
consumers the right to examine witnesses and to cross-examine opposition witnesses in order to resolve factual disputes in ERISA
claims litigation, denies the right to a jury trial, denies the right to
conduct discovery as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and denies consumers the opportunity to conduct a de novo
trial before a neutral fact-finder when challenging an insurance
company's claim denial.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision, Aetna
Health, Inc. v. Davila, establishes that ERISA prohibits plan participants from pursuing extra-contractualdamages under state law
in actions arisingfrom abusive claims settlement practices committed by ERISA plan insurers.However, Davila does not totally void
state bad faith insurance laws in ERISA claims litigation; the decision only nullifies the plan participant'sindividual remedy against
an ERISA plan insurerfor extra-contractualdamages. The Davila
case offers the opportunity to re-examine the ongoing influence of
state bad faith insurance laws in the ERISA context. This Article
suggests that state bad faith insurance laws continue to set standards of behavior that insurers, even ERISA plan insurers, must
abide by in theirclaims settlement practices.The remaining impact
of state bad faith laws on individual plan participantclaims after
* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, University of
Oklahoma College of Law; A.B. 1974 Brown University; J.D. 1979 Wake Forest University School of Law: donbogan@ou.edu.
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Davila may be to help plan participantsrecover at least their contract damages under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) when courts apply
an arbitraryand capricious standard of review to ERISA plan insurer claim denials. An insurer's violation of state bad faith standards when evaluating claims may define the insurer's actions as
arbitraryand capricious, per se, in ERISA cases applying the deferential review standard. Despite Davila, recent Supreme Court
ERISA cases confirm that the states can still have a significant role
to play in regulating ERISA plan insurers and in enforcing state
insurance laws. In particular, now that the Supreme Court has
nullified individual plan participant state law remedies, consumers should urge their state Insurance Commissioners to enforce unfair insurancepractices laws in order to curb insurance bad faith
arising in the ERISA context. Additionally, states that act to prohibit grants of discretionarypowers in insurance contracts may restore an equal legal footing to consumers who contest ERISA benefit claim denials by assuringplan participantsa de novo hearing
when they challenge their ERISA plan insurers.
I.

PREFACE

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")' regulates employment-provided fringe benefit plans,
including both pension benefit plans and non-pension or "welfare"
benefit plans.2 Among the most prominent welfare benefit plans
subject to ERISA regulation are health care benefit plans and disability benefit plans.3
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,

88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. III
1997) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ERISA]. A selected history of ERISA, beginning in January 1973 with
the introduction of House Bill 2, H.R. 2, 93d Cong. (1973), and Senate Bill 4, S.
4, 93d Cong. (1973), the bills which ultimately formed the basis of the final
legislation, are compiled in a three volume committee print. See 1-3
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE,
94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].

2. Employee benefit plans are fringe benefit programs provided or available to workers and their beneficiaries through the worker's employment, either from the worker's employer, or union, or from both. ERISA §§ 3(1)-(2), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2) (2000). Welfare benefit plans are any non-pension fringe
benefit programs, whether self-funded by the plan sponsor or funded through
the purchase of insurance, including health care benefit plans, accident and
death benefit plans, disability benefit plans, and severance benefit plans.
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The most significant exceptions to ERISA's
regulation of employee benefit plans are for government provided plans and
for church plans. See ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b).
3. See Jon Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental
System Under Scrutiny, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1999, at 63, available at
http'/content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/reprintll8/6/62 (reporting that 152 million
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ERISA plan sponsors often fund health care plans and disability plans through the purchase of insurance. The states have
historically regulated insurance, consequently, ERISA's enactment
created the potential for overlap and conflict between the states'
regulation of insurance and ERISA's regulation of employee benefit plans. Congress addressed the relationship between state and
federal law in ERISA by including an express preemption provision in the statute.5
ERISA's preemption language dealing with state law contains
three inter-related subparts, commonly known as the preemption
clause, the savings clause, and the deemer clause.' The preemption
clause recites that ERISA shall supersede any and all state laws

Americans receive health care benefits through their employment, including
ninety-three percent of privately insured Americans). See also HEALTH, EDUC.,
& HUMAN SERVS. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYER-BASED
HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 44-48
(1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?HEHS-95-167 (reporting, based upon a 1993 survey, that approximately 114 million Americans received their health care benefits from employer- or union-sponsored health
plans).
4. Many large employers, and an increasing number of smaller employers,
now self-insure their health care benefit plans; however, "self-insure" is
somewhat of a misnomer, because the large majority of small firms, in particular, that self-insure, obtain re-insurance protection by purchasing stop-loss
insurance. See Gregory Acs et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1996, at
269-70, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/15/2/266.
5. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144. The statute provides in relevant part:
Other laws

(a) Supersedure;...
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and
not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)] of this title ....
(b) Construction and application
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) of this title [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section 4(b) of this
title [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)] (other than a plan established primarily for
the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged
in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
6. See id. ERISA's express preemption language also recites that ERISA
shall not be construed to supersede any other federal laws. See ERISA
§ 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
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that relate to any employee benefit plan.7 The savings clause then
exempts state laws that regulate insurance from ERISA preemption.8 Finally, the deemer clause prohibits the states from treating
self-funded employee benefit plans as insurers for purposes of
ERISA's savings clause exception to preemption.'
In addition to ERISA's express preemption language, the
statute contains a civil enforcement provision which provides the
foundation for even further preemption of state law, according the
United States Supreme Court. ERISA's civil enforcement provision, found at section 502 of the statute, details specific remedies
authorized by Congress to serve ERISA plan participants and
beneficiaries, ERISA fiduciaries, and the United States Secretary
of Labor.1" Despite the lack of standing for other potential ag7. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ERISA section 514(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(c), defines state law to include state decisional law, in addition to statutes and regulations.
8. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). ERISA's legislative history discloses that the insurance savings clause was contemplated long before
the Conference Committee significantly broadened the scope of the preemption clause. Compare H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 82-83 (1974), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4357-58, with S. 4, 93d Cong. § 609
(1973), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 186-87. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 977-85
(2000) [hereinafter Bogan, ProtectingPatient Rights]. ERISA's savings clause
appears to have been a non-controversial provision when included in the early
versions of ERISA; however, after the Conference Committee expanded the
reach of the preemption clause, the savings clause exception to preemption
grew significantly in importance. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 745-46 & n.23 (1985). See generally Donald T. Bogan, ERISA:
The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, and
State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 118-20 (2001) [hereinafter
Bogan, Savings Clause].
9. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). See FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
10. Employee fringe benefit programs often offer insurance coverage or
other benefits for both the worker (plan participant) and for the worker's family members or other designated persons entitled to receive a benefit (plan
beneficiary). See ERISA § 3(7)-(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)-(8). For ease of reference, throughout this Article I will use the term participant to include any
person who may be entitled to receive a benefit under an ERISA plan.
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, provides:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be
brought -

(1) by a participant or beneficiary (A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section [concerning requests to the administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [§ 1109] [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
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grieved parties not expressly authorized to bring suit under
ERISA section 502, the Supreme Court has characterized ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme as comprehensive." Based upon that
characterization, the Supreme Court suggests that Congress intended ERISA to provide the exclusive remedies available for plan
participants in claims arising from their employee benefit plans."
ERISA's savings clause allows the states to indirectly regulate employee benefit plans by regulating ERISA plan insurers.' 3
As part of their historic role in regulating insurance, most states
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title or the terms of
the plan;
(4) by the secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [1025(c)] [information to be furnished to participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2), (4),
(5), or (6) of subsection (c) or under subsection (i) or (1);
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order (as defined in section 609(a)(2)(A) [§ 1169(a)(2)(A)];
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person referred to in
section 101(f) (1) [§ 1021(f)(1)], to enjoin any act or practice which violates subsection (f) of section 101 [§ 1021(f)], or (B) to obtain appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such subsection; or
(a) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or insurance
annuity in connection with termination of an individual's status as a
participant covered under a pension plan with respect to all or any portion of the participant's pension benefit under such plan constitutes a
violation of part 4 of this title [subtitle] or the terms of the plan, by the
Secretary, by any individual who was a participant or beneficiary at the
time of the alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain appropriate relief, including the posting of security if necessary, to assure receipt by
the participant or beneficiary of the amounts provided or to be provided
by such insurance contract or annuity, plus reasonable prejudgment interest on such amounts.
Paragraphs seven and eight were added to section 502 by amendment in 1993,
while paragraph nine was added the following year.
11. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1987); Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985).
12. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. ("The deliberate care with which ERISA's
civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's
civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive."). But see Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (explaining
ERISA's savings clause "makes clear that Congress did not intend to preempt
entirely every state cause of action relating to [ERISA employee benefit
plans]").
13. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 64-65; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 747.
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require that insurers treat their customers in accordance with a
standard of good faith and fair dealing. 4 Additionally, many states
allow consumers to recover extra-contractual damages, including
punitive damages or treble damages, from insurers who violate the
standard of good faith and fair dealing in their interactions with
insurance consumers. 5 States developed the law of insurance bad
faith remedies because history had shown that, absent exposure to
an extra-contractual remedy, insurance companies often failed to
treat their insured's fairly, particularly in the claims evaluation
16
process.
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme only allows plan participants to obtain contract-based monetary damages from plans that
wrongfully deny employee benefit claims. 7 Because ERISA's civil
14. See generally STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND

DAMAGES (2d ed. 1997).
15. See, e.g., Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904
(Okla. 1977); Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02
(1970). See generally ASHLEY, supra note 14. There is some debate in various
jurisdictions concerning the level of scienter an insured must prove to recover
in a bad faith action, with a minority of states allowing recovery against an
insurer "if a person of ordinary prudence, in the exercise of that degree of care
which such a person would use in the management of his affairs" would pay a
claim or settle a claim. See id. § 2:04 (citing cases). For my purposes in this
Article suggesting that proof of an insurer's bad faith should be viewed as a
per se abuse of discretion in an ERISA action where a court reviews an insured plan's claim denial under a deferential standard of review, I limit my
analysis to those circumstances where bad faith is established under a level of
scienter greater than mere negligence. See, e.g., Badillo v. Mid Century Ins.
Co., 2004 OK 42, 2004 Okla. LEXIS 49, at *33 (Okla. June 8, 2004) ("bad faith
must involve dishonest intentions, unconscientious advantage, or action taken
that is unreasonable and unfounded."). See generally ASHLEY, supra note 14,
§§ 2:04-2:06 (comparing different scienter standards).
16. See generally id. The duty of good faith and fair dealing as applied to
insurance contracts recognizes the separate promise, of economic and emotional security, that insurers make to their insureds that the insurer will be
there for the insured in times of crisis. See, e.g., Christianv. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d at 904 ("'[W]e consider the duty of an insurer to act in good
faith and fairly when handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty not to
withhold unreasonably payments due under a policy .... That responsibility
is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself-to defend,
settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under
which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities.'") (quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032,
1037 (Cal. 1973)); Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d at 404
("[Tihe special relationship and duties [imposing a duty of good faith and fair
dealing upon insurers] of the insurer exist in recognition of the fact that the
insured does not contract... 'to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect
[himself] against the risks of accidental losses, including mental distress
which might follow from the losses. Among the considerations in purchasing
... insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and security it
will provide in the event of an accidental loss.. . .'") (quoting Crisci v. Sec. Ins.
Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967)). See generally ASHLEY, supra note 14.
17. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147 (characterizing
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enforcement provision does not specifically authorize plan participants who have been mistreated by their ERISA plan insurers to
obtain consequential damages or punitive damages for bad faith
breach of an insurance contract, plan insurers have urged courts
to limit plan participants to the monetary remedy for contract
damages available under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)."'
State laws that provide consumer remedies aimed solely at
the insurance industry present a unique ERISA preemption puzzle. The statute's express preemption language instructs that
ERISA does not preempt state insurance laws. However, the Supreme Court says that ERISA impliedly preempts state law remedies arising in connection with plan participant employee benefit
claims. When an ERISA plan participant sues an ERISA plan insurer under a state insurance law that provides a specific consumer remedy aimed solely at the insurance industry, implied
preemption of state law remedies under ERISA section 502 directly confronts ERISA's express savings clause exception to preemption located in ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A). Is the state insurance law remedy expressly saved from preemption under ERISA
section 514, thereby allowing the consumer to seek extracontractual damages against the plan insurer, or does ERISA
shield the plan insurer from claims for extra-contractual damages
by impliedly preempting the state law bad faith remedy under
ERISA section 502?19
The question of ERISA's preemptive impact on state bad faith
insurance claims has caused lower court confusion, particularly in
recent years as the Supreme Court has more prominently emphasized the maxim that federal law should not be interpreted to suan ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) claim as authorizing contractual damages).
Plan participants can also obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. See ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (participant can sue "to clarify his
rights to future benefits"); ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (civil action may be brought "to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this title or the terms of the plan"). ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) also allows plan participants to recover "other appropriate equitable relief," though the Supreme Court has not yet defined the parameters of
such equitable relief. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502
n.7 (2004); id. at 2503-04 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also DiFelice v. Aetna
U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453-67 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring).
See generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable" The Supreme Court's Trail of Errorin Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1317 (2003).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 41.
19. See generally Bogan, Savings Clause, supra note 8, at 153-55 (characterizing implied preemption versus the savings clause exception to preemption
as a different form of statutory construction problem than the classic federal
law versus state law preemption question, and suggesting that the question of

ERISA's preemption of state law bad faith remedies instead presents an internal battle within ERISA, pitting ERISA section 514 versus ERISA section
502).
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persede state law in areas of historic state regulatory authority,
2°
unless Congress clearly manifests an intention to preempt. In a
2004 decision, Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila," the Supreme Court
firmly established that implied preemption under ERISA's remedies provision trumps the statute's express savings clause exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance.22
While the question of a plan participant's access to state law
remedies is now resolved (and resolved against consumers), further questions concerning the scope of ERISA's preemption of
state bad faith laws, and of other state insurance laws, remain.
Bad faith laws do more than just authorize an extra-contractual
remedy; bad faith laws define standards of conduct that insurance
companies must adhere to in their interactions with insurance
consumers. The Davila ruling eliminates plan participants' bad
faith insurance remedies; however, it remains uncertain how
courts will apply ERISA's savings clause when plan participants'
urge courts to hold ERISA plan insurers to the specific standards
of behavior required under state unfair insurance practices laws.
Additionally, many states empower their state Insurance Commissioner to seek injunctive relief, or penalties, or both against insurance companies that violate state insurance law standards of good
faith and fair dealing.' Does ERISA section 502 preempt state insurance law remedies in favor of state governmental officials who
lack standing to sue under ERISA section 502?
Part II below briefly summarizes the history of state bad faith
insurance claims under ERISA up to the Davila ruling. Part III
explores Davila. Part IV suggests that, even after Davila, state
law bad faith standards are saved from ERISA preemption and
20. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995).
21. 124 S.Ct. 2488.
22. See id. at 2500 ("As this Court has recognized in both Rush Prudential
and Pilot Life, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a).
Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that

can arguably be characterized as 'regulating insurance' will be pre-empted if it
provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addi-

tion to, ERISA's remedial scheme."). Prior to Davila, I examined this issue of
implied preemption versus the savings clause exception to preemption and
concluded that ERISA's express language saving state insurance laws from
preemption should defeat the inference of preemption of state law remedies
arising under ERISA section 502. See generally Bogan, Savings Clause, supra

note 8.
23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15; OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1250.11250.16 (2000). See also Farlow v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791, 795
(11th Cir. 1989) (describing Alabama's unfair insurance practices law). See
generally ASHLEY, supra note 14, § 9:03, and apps. I-VI, which reprint the
Model Unfair Insurance Practices Laws, promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("Model Acts"), including the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (app. III).
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may impact the outcome of section 502(a)(1)(B) claims for benefits
due by defining certain unfair insurance claims settlement practices as arbitrary and capricious. Part V examines state statutes
that authorize state Insurance Commissioners to enforce state unfair insurance practices laws and concludes that such enforcement
actions do not fall within the scope of ERISA section 502's implied
preemption. Finally, Part VI comments briefly on a model insurance regulation recently adopted by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), which aims to restore de novo
review of plan participant insured benefit claims by utilizing
ERISA's savings clause exception to preemption.

II. ERISA's PREEMPTIVE IMPACT ON BAD FAITH REMEDIES
PRIOR TO DAVILA

A.

Pilot Life: The Savings Clause,Implied Preemption,
and State Bad FaithLaws
In a 1987 case from Mississippi, Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, 4 the United States Supreme Court first examined
whether ERISA preempts state law claims for bad faith breach of
an insurance contract.25 The employer and plan sponsor in Pilot
Life, Entex, Inc., offered its workers disability coverage as an employee fringe benefit. Entex, Inc. funded the employee disability
benefits plan by purchasing insurance from Pilot Life Insurance
Company ("Pilot Life").2 After a frustrating series of stops and
starts, ultimately resulting in the denial of his disability claim,
Mr. Dedeaux sued Pilot Life under state law seeking disability
benefits pursuant to the insurance contract, plus consequential
damages and punitive damages under Mississippi's common law

24. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
26. See id. at 52-57. See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. at
147-48 (concluding that a plan participant cannot recover extra-contractual
damages under ERISA section 502(a)(2) for a fiduciary's breach of duty in vio-

lation of ERISA section 409).
26. ERISA requires that plan sponsors fund employee pension plans
through the establishment of a trust or through the purchase of insurance. See
ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103. However, ERISA's funding rules do not apply
to welfare benefit plans. See ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1). Consequently, while welfare plan sponsors that choose to fund plan promises must
either establish a trust for that purpose or purchase insurance to fund the
promise, welfare plan sponsors can choose not to fund their employee benefit
plans. When a welfare benefit plan sponsor chooses not to fund a plan, so that
no trust is established and no insurance policy exists, benefits must be paid
out of the plan sponsor's operating capital. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally
Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Rethinking Firestone in Light of Great-WestImplicationsfor Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare

Benefit Claims,37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 670-72 (2004).
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tort action for bad faith breach of contract.27 Pilot Life defended
the action by asserting ERISA preemption as an affirmative defense to the state law claims. 8
To defeat the insurance company's argument that ERISA
preempted his state law claims for punitive damages, Mr.
Dedeaux asserted that ERISA expressly saved his bad faith breach
of contract remedy from preemption because the remedies law
regulated insurance. Pilot Life responded that Mississippi's common law bad faith remedy was not aimed solely at the insurance
industry, and therefore, that it was not a law that regulates insurance within ERISA's savings clause.' Additionally, the Solicitor
27. Dedeaux sought contract damages in the form of benefits due under the
insurance policy, consequential tort damages for infliction of mental and emotional distress, and punitive damages for bad faith breach of contract. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43.
28. Mr. Dedeaux filed his action in federal district court based upon diversity jurisdiction; consequently, the question of federal court removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine did not arise in Pilot Life. Further, the Pilot Life opinion does not discuss whether the federal district court
should have converted Dedeaux's state law insurance claim to a claim under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits due under a plan. On the same day the
Supreme Court decided Pilot Life, the Court also issued its opinion in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), which did address
federal court removal jurisdiction in claims arising from an ERISA plan originally filed in state court. In Taylor, the Court first held that the complete preemption doctrine applies to ERISA, and that ERISA completely preempts all
state law claims that fall within the scope of ERISA section 502. Cf Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28 (discussing applicability of complete preemption
doctrine to ERISA, but holding that ERISA does not completely preempt state
tax agency's garnishment action against an ERISA trust). See discussion infra
in text accompanying notes 70-114.
29. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court crafted a two-part savings clause test, where part two of the test included a three-pronged analysis. 471 U.S. at 740-44. When the Supreme Court
applied that test in Pilot Life, the Court asked first whether the state law in
question regulated insurance under a common sense understanding of that
phrase. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48. Then the Court applied the threepronged test the Court had utilized in deciding whether an insurer could avoid
federal anti-trust regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act factors ask whether the state law at issue affects an
integral part of the insured-insurer relationship; whether the state law transfers policyholder risk; and whether the regulated practice is limited to entities
within the insurance industry. Id. at 48-49. Subsequently, in Kentucky Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller ("KAHP"), the Supreme Court abandoned the
McCarran-Ferguson Act-based test and substituted a new two-factor savings
clause test for evaluating whether a state law regulates insurance within the
meaning of ERISA's savings clause. 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003). The KAHP
test now instructs courts to determine first, whether a state law is "specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance," and second, whether the law
"substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and
the insured." Id. at 342. See generally Matthew G. Vansuch, Note, Not Just
Old Wine in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller Bottles a New Test for State Regulation of Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253

(2005).
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General, appearing as amicus curiae in Pilot Life, suggested that
ERISA impliedly preempted Mr. Dedeaux's state law claims because Congress intended ERISA's civil enforcement provision (section 502) to provide the exclusive remedies for all plan participant
complaints arising from the alleged mishandling of an employee
benefit claim. 0
The United States Supreme Court found that, under Mississippi law, the bad faith breach of contract remedy for extracontractual damages could arise from the breach of any contract,
not just an insurance contract.31 Consequently, said the Court, the
Mississippi bad faith remedies law did not fit within ERISA's savings clause exception to preemption as a law that regulates insurance. Further, in dicta that would ultimately become the most far
reaching component of the opinion, 2 the Pilot Life Court suggested
that the comprehensiveness of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
indicated that Congress intended to preempt all state law remedies arising from a plan participant's challenge to an adverse
benefits determination.'
Following Pilot Life, and for more than a decade, lower courts
uniformly held that ERISA preempted all plan participant state
law bad faith claims, even statutory claims that expressly applied
only against the insurance industry, either because the state laws
did not regulate insurance within the meaning of ERISA's express
savings clause,' or because ERISA impliedly preempted the bad
30. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52. See also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (No
85-1043), available at LEXIS at 1985 U.S. Briefs 1043.
31. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49-50.
32. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 (relying on Pilot Life to hold that implied
preemption of state law remedies under section 502 trumps ERISA's express
savings clause exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance).
33. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 ("The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive is supported, first, by the language and structure of the
civil enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history in which Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of § 502 was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185."). But see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part and Supporting Respondent in
Part at 25, UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868),
available at LEXIS at 1997 U.S. Briefs 1868 (distinguishing the LMRA analogy from ERISA section 502 claims by noting that preemption of state law
remedies under LMRA section 301 is not limited by an express savings clause
exception to preemption as in ERISA).
34. See Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467, 1468-69 (11th
Cir. 1988) (remarking that an action under Florida's unfair insurance practices statute is preempted by ERISA, even though the state law applies only
against the insurance industry, because the unfair insurance practices law
does not transfer risk or affect an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship). See also In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (8th Cir.
1988) (citing cases).
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faith remedy,35 or for both reasons. 36 Then in the mid-to-late
1990's, the Supreme Court issued a series of ERISA preemption
decisions that appeared to signal a retreat from the expansive
view of ERISA preemption developed by the Court in its early
37
ERISA cases, as exemplified by Pilot Life.
B. Travelers, the Ward Footnote, and the Moran Dicta
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court announced what
appeared to be a major shift in its ERISA preemption analysis.
The Court chose a case involving state law taxes, New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.," to herald the Court's new direction for analyzing ERISA's
preemption language. Prior to Travelers, the Supreme Court had
applied ERISA preemption very broadly under its "plain meaning"
interpretation of the "relates to" language in ERISA's preemption
clause.39 In Travelers, the Court re-examined its approach and determined that the plain meaning model of statutory construction
failed to clarify the law of ERISA preemption because "[i]f 'relate
to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run
4°
its course for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere."'
41
Abandoning the plain meaning interpretative method, the
Court returned to one of the bedrock principles of Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence by emphasizing that "[we] have addressed
claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law ....[Additionally,] we
35. See Kanne v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that ERISA impliedly preempts state unfair insurance practices claim
under ERISA section 502, even if state remedies law only applied against insurance industry).
36. See Juckett v. Beecham Home Improvement Prods., Inc., 684 F. Supp.
448-50 (N.D. Tex. 1988). See generally Bogan, Savings Clause, supra note 8, at

150.
37. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806,

813 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55.

38. 514 U.S. at 645.
39. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) ("We
must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe

Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning.").
40. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting HENRY JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON
(New York ed., World Classics 1980) (1875)). See also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. at 335 (Scalia,

J., concurring) ("[A]pplying the 'relate to' provision according to its terms was

a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.").
41. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 ("We simply must go beyond the unhelp-

ful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead

to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law

that Congress understood would survive.").
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have worked on the 'assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'""
The new Travelers shift in emphasis caused some lower
courts to re-examine the question of ERISA's preemption of state
law bad faith claims, particularly after the 1999 decision in
UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward.' In Ward, the Supreme Court
re-kindled plan participants' hopes that the Court may narrow the
application of PilotLife implied preemption of state law remedies,
primarily through a footnote referencing the conflict between implied preemption under ERISA section 502 and the savings clause
exception to preemption."
Ward involved a claim for disability benefits against an
ERISA plan insurer. Mr. Ward had previously obtained state and
social security disability benefits, but was apparently unaware
that he was also covered under a group disability insurance policy
provided through his employment. Almost two years after he
stopped working, Mr. Ward discovered the insurance policy, issued
by UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM"), while
cleaning out a safety deposit box.' Mr. Ward filed a claim with
UNUM, however, the UNUM policy required plan participants to
submit a proof of loss within eighteen months of the onset of a
claimed disability. Since Mr. Ward failed to meet the policy deadline, UNUM rejected the claim. '
California, where Mr. Ward lived and worked, however, applied a state common law insurance regulation, known as the "notice-prejudice" rule, which offered Mr. Ward some relief. Under the
notice-prejudice rule, in order for an insurer to enforce a policyimposed notice deadline, it had to show that the delay in presenting a claim actually prejudiced the insurer's ability to defend the
action.' After UNUM refused to consider Mr. Ward's disability
claim, Mr. Ward sued UNUM under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) to
recover benefits due from the plan, invoking the California notice42. Id. at 654-55 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,

230 (1947)). This rule suggests that the presumption against preemption applies with extra vigor where the state law at issue regulates in a subject area

that the states have historically dominated. See generally Bogan, Protecting
Patient Rights, supra note 8, at 1012-18; Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE
J. ON REG. 255, 257 (1996).
43. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
44. See id. at 377 n.7.
45. See id. at 365. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Petitioner in Part and Supporting Respondent in Part at 2, UNUM
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868).

46. Mr. Ward filed his lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitations.
The UNUM policy imposed time limits to provide notice of claims that were
shorter than the statute of limitations.
47. See Ward, 526 U.S. at 368-73.
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prejudice rule to overcome the policy deadline.
UNUM advanced two arguments in defense of Mr. Ward's
pleas: first, that Mr. Ward could not avoid the notice provision in
the insurance contract because ERISA expressly preempted the
California notice-prejudice rule;" and second, that ERISA impliedly preempted California's notice-prejudice rule because application of the rule would allow a state law to interfere with ERISA's
civil enforcement provision.49 Because UNUM urged both express
preemption under ERISA section 514 and implied preemption under ERISA section 502 as defenses to Mr. Ward's claim, the United
States Solicitor General, appearing as amicus curiae, addressed
the interaction between implied preemption under ERISA section
502 and the express savings clause exception to preemption found
in ERISA section 514.50
Previously in Pilot Life, the Solicitor General had urged the
view, then adopted by the Supreme Court, that Congress intended
ERISA's civil enforcement provision to impliedly preempt all plan
participant state law claims arising in connection with the denial
of an employee benefit claim.51 In Ward, the Solicitor General
modified the position his office had advanced as amicus curiae in
Pilot Life concerning the scope of implied preemption under
ERISA section 502.
In Ward, the Solicitor General pointed out that the state law
claim at issue in Pilot Life was a law of general application, and
not a law that specifically regulated insurance; consequently, Pilot
Life did not present a conflict between implied preemption and
ERISA's express savings clause.52 The preemption question in
Ward was more complicated than in Pilot Life, said the Solicitor
General, because the California notice-prejudice rule at issue in
Ward was a law that regulates insurance.' If the Court determined that the California notice-prejudice rule fit within the scope
of ERISA section 502 implied preemption, as asserted by UNUM,
the Solicitor General in Ward argued that implied preemption under ERISA section 502 conflicted with ERISA's express savings
clause exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance. The Solicitor General in Ward concluded that if a state law
provides a remedy that can be pursued only against the insurance
industry, and therefore fits within ERISA's savings clause, the
48. See Brief for Petitioner at 22-32, UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S.
358 (1999) (No. 97-1868), availableat LEXIS at 1997 U.S. Briefs 1868.
49. See id. at 32-36.
50. See Ward, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7.

51. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (No 85-1043).
52. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
in Part and Supporting Respondent in Part at 21-22, UNUM Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward,

526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868).

53. See id. at 22-25 & n.14.
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savings clause express exception to preemption must trump the
implied preemption of state law remedies.'
Ultimately, the Ward Court did not reach the question of implied preemption under ERISA section 502 versus the savings
clause because the Court found that California's notice-prejudice
rule did not provide an alternative state law remedy in conflict
with ERISA section 5 0 2 .' In a footnote reference, however, the
Ward Court recognized the friction between implied preemption
under ERISA section 502 and ERISA section 514's express savings
clause. In the footnote, the Ward Court remarked on how the Solicitor General had refined its implied preemption analysis since
Pilot Life, but the Court did not specifically agree or disagree with
the Solicitor General's conclusion that ERISA's express exception
to preemption trumps implied preemption arising under the statute's civil enforcement provision.6
Following Ward, a number of plan participant lawyers read
the Supreme Court's trend to limit the scope of ERISA preemption
following Travelers in conjunction with the Ward footnote and
therein found instructions to press courts to revisit the issue of
ERISA's preemption of state law insurance bad faith claims in
states (unlike Mississippi) where the remedy only applied against
the insurance industry. While the majority of lower courts continued to reject plan participant state law bad faith claims,57 a handful of federal district judges found room to distinguish Pilot Life,
based upon the Ward footnote, and allowed plan participants' to
pursue bad faith claims arising from state law in states where the
claim was only available against the insurance industry.'
Four years after Ward, the Supreme Court added another
54. See Ward, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part and Supporting Respondent in
Part at 22-25 & n.14, UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No.
97-1868).

55. Ward held that the state notice-prejudice rule is saved from preemption

under ERISA section 514 as a law that regulates insurance. Acknowledging

that the state law notice-prejudice rule would control the outcome of the benefits claim, the Court nonetheless found that the state law did not provide a
separate state law remedy because the plan participant was still required to
sue under ERISA section 502 to recover his benefits. See Ward, 526 U.S. at
376-77.
56. See id. at 377 n.7.
57. See, e.g., Coffman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 764, 766-68
(S.D. W. Va. 2001); Love v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 997, 100105 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
58. See, e.g., Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D.

Ala. 2000), overruled by Gilbert v. ALTA Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 01-10829,

2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27200 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001); Lewis v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999). Each of these cases

relies on express preemption under ERISA section 514, and most prominently,
the savings clause exception to preemption; they do not address the issue of
implied preemption under ERISA section 502.
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helpful ingredient to the recipe of reasons plan participants urged
to limit the Pilot Life holding in state bad faith insurance claims.
In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller ("KAHP), 59 the
Supreme Court abandoned the three-factor savings clause test
which it had created in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,' and relied upon in Pilot Life,6 to determine whether a
challenged state law regulates insurance. 2 The new, broader savings clause test announced in KAHP further advanced the rationale for lower courts to conclude that Pilot Life should be narrowly
construed, and that ERISA does not preempt state law bad faith
insurance claims.' In evaluating a state law to ascertain whether
the law regulates insurance under ERISA's savings clause, the
KHAP test now instructs courts to determine first, whether a state
law is "specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, " and second, whether the law "substantially affect[s] the
59. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
60. 471 U.S. 724, 740-44 (1985).
61. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48-51.
62. See KAHP, 538 U.S. at 341-42.
[W]e make a clear break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors and hold
that for a state law to be deemed a 'law ... which regulates insurance'
under § 1144 (b)(2)(A) [the savings clause], it must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance [citing Pilot Life, UNUM, and Rush Prudential].
Second, as explained above, the state law must substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. Kentucky's [AWP] law satisfies each of these requirements.
Id.
63. See Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1090 (2003) (holding the state unfair insurance
practices act is a law that regulates insurance under KAHP, however, state
law claim for extra-contractual damages is still impliedly preempted by
ERISA section 502); Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir.
2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that
ERISA impliedly preempts state law bad faith claims under section 502, but
dissenting from the majority opinion's analysis of the savings clause because
he believed that Colorado's unfair insurance practices law regulates insurance
under the new KAHP two-factor test). But see Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance
Co., 394 F.3d 262, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2004 (common law bad faith claim is not
directed toward entities engaged in insurance under KAHP test); Barber v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co., 383 F.3d 134, 142-44 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pennsylvania bad
faith claim does not substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between
insurer and insured under KAHP test); Allison v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 381
F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2004) (Oklahoma common law bad faith claim not saved
under KAHP test). See generally Donald T. Bogan, Saving State Law BadFaith Claims from Preemption, TRIAL, Apr. 2003, at 52 (enumerating reasons
why ERISA should not be interpreted to preempt state law bad faith claims).
64. KAHP confirms that a state law which is "specifically directed toward
entities engaged in insurance" does not have to be limited in its scope exclusively to entities solely engaged in insurance. See 538 U.S. at 336 n.1. The
KAHP Court stated:
[Wie think petitioners' argument [that a law does not fall within the
savings clause if it is directed at entities engaged in insurance and some
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risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured."65
The final Supreme Court wrinkle preceding Davila then came
with Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran.' In Moran, the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA does not preempt a state external
review law which required insurers that refused to approve medical treatment recommended by a plan participant's physician to
submit to binding review of the claim denial by an independent
panel. Rush Prudential HMO argued that ERISA preempted Illinois' external review law because it provided an alternative remedy to the remedies provided in ERISA section 502. The Supreme
Court rejected Rush Prudential HMO's argument that the external review law created an alternate remedy to ERISA section 502
under the same reasoning it had applied in Ward. The Supreme
Court held that, even though the state external review law dictated the result of the claims dispute, to enforce the claim for
benefits the plan participant still had to sue under ERISA section
502 (a)(1)(B) to recover the benefit.
Despite the Court's conclusion that section 502 implied preemption did not apply in Moran, the Court nonetheless offered its
opinion on the implied preemption versus the savings clause exception to preemption controversy. In a gratuitous aside that
would subsequently be relied upon in Davila to shut the door on
plan participant state law claims for extra-contractual damages,'
the Moran Court declared that the inference of preemption of state
law remedies arising from ERISA's civil enforcement scheme was
that are not] is foreclosed by Rush Prudential,536 U.S at 372, where we

noted that Illinois' independent-review laws contained "some overbreadth in the application of [the Illinois statute] beyond orthodox
HMO's," yet held that "there is no reason to think Congress would have
meant such minimal application to noninsurers to remove a state law
entirely from the category of insurance regulation saved from preemption."

Id.
65. See id. at 342. KAHP makes clear that the savings clause does not apply only to state laws that regulate insurance companies that deal in risk. The
savings clause applies to state laws that regulate any "entity engaged in insurance" including, for example, an entity that performs insurance claims
processing services, such as an HMO, and arguably, an insurance company or

Blue Cross/Blue Shield that just provides administrative services to a selfinsured plan (often identified as a Third Party Administrator or "TPA"), even
if the entity does not sell products that spread risk. See id. at 336 n.1

("[Nioninsuring HMOs [that do not act as insurer's but instead provide administrative services] would be administering self-insured plans, which we think
suffices to bring them within the activity of insurance for purposes of
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) [the savings clause]."). See generally Vansuch, supra note 29.
66. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
67. See id. at 380. Cf. Haw. Mgt. Alliance Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 100 P.3d
952 (Haw. 2004) (holding ERISA preempts Hawaii external review law to the

extent the state law creates a state law remedy to enforce an independent reviewer's decision).
68. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500.
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so strong that it trumped even the express language of the statute
that would have otherwise saved the state insurance law remedies
from preemption.'

III. DAVILA ESTABLISHES THAT ERISA PREEMPTS PLAN
PARTICIPANT STATE LAW REMEDIES
0
ERISA's express exception to
In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,"
preemption for state laws that regulate insurance actually collided
with implied preemption under ERISA section 502 for the first
time.71 The Texas statute at issue in Davila provided a negligence
remedy aimed at the insurance industry, not a bad faith law, but
the Davila result clearly encompasses bad faith claims asserted
against ERISA plan insurers.
The advent of managed care in our health care delivery system has brought a blurring of the lines that had historically separated the providers of health care to consumers from the payors of
health care provider bills-typically Blue Cross & Blue Shield entities or private health insurance companies for non-elderly consumers. In particular, Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs") now often serve as both health care providers and
health care benefits insurers. 2 As part of its efforts to regulate the
health care industry and the insurance industry in response to the
newer models of health care delivery systems, Texas enacted an
HMO reform law known as the Texas Health Care Liability Act
("THCLA). 73 The THCLA creates a remedy for individuals against
health care insurers, HMOs, and other managed care entities who
fail to exercise ordinary care in refusing to pay for recommended

69. Moran, 536 U.S. at 375-77.
70. 124 S.Ct. 2488.
71. See Moran, 536 U.S. at 359 (applying savings clause, but holding that
state external review law does not implicate implied preemption under ERISA
section 502 because state law does not provide an alternate remedy); Ward,
526 U.S. at 364 (applying savings clause, but holding state notice-prejudice
law does not implicate implied preemption under ERISA section 502 because
state law does not provide an alternate remedy); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43-44

(discussing implied preemption under ERISA section 502, but holding state
bad faith breach of contract remedies law at issue does not regulate insurance); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66 (discussing implied pre-

emption under ERISA section 502, but holding state tort remedy for infliction
of emotional distress does not regulate insurance); Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 28 (discussing complete preemption doctrine based upon implied preemption of state law remedies under ERISA section 502, and suggesting that
implied preemption under section 502 is limited by the savings clause, but
remanding back to state court because ERISA does not completely preempt
state tax collection agency's garnishment remedy where state agency does not

have standing to sue under ERISA section 502).
72. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218-20 (2000) (noting that

HMO's assume risk and act as insurers when they make coverage decisions).
73. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (Vernon Supp.

2004).
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medical treatment because the insurer determines the treatment
is not medically necessary.74 The targets of the Texas statute are
entities that make medical judgments in the context of insurance
coverage determinations.75
In Davila, the Supreme Court found that ERISA nullified the
plan participants' THCLA negligence claims against their HMOs
or health insurers because the state law claims conflicted with the
exclusive remedies provided in ERISA's civil enforcement provi-

74. Id. § 88.002(a). A primary battlefield in the managed care debate involves the standard exception to coverage in health insurance policies for
treatment that is not "medically necessary." Under the traditional fee-forservice, prospective pay model of health insurance contracts, physicians, in
consult with their patients, decided upon a treatment plan without regular
involvement of the insurers who would ultimately bear the cost of the treatment decision. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 218. One of the defining characteristics of managed care is the shift to pre-certification in health insurance
regimens that allows an insurer to impose its judgment on what treatment is
medically necessary for a covered patient before the treatment is rendered. Id.
at 219. As a result of the shift in who makes the "medically necessary" determination, from treating physician (or other providers) to insurers, insurers
now make medical judgments that substantially affect health care consumers.
See id. at 228-31 (noting that when an HMO doctor decides what treatment is
medically necessary for a patient, the HMO doctor makes a mixed eligibility
decision). The THCLA illustrates one way in which the states have responded
to problems that have arisen when health insurers, rather than treating medical providers, determine what amount or kind of medical service is proper or
reasonable to treat a patient's medical condition. The THCIA response imposes a similar duty of care on insurers who exercise medical judgments in the
context of coverage decisions that the state common law imposes on physicians
making the same treatment decisions. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex.
Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2000). Another way states have responded to problems that have arisen when an insurance company or HMO
decides what treatment is medically necessary (and which they must therefore
reimburse or provide) is by enacting "external review" laws. See, e.g., Illinois
Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2000);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.09, 20A.12A (Vernon 1997). If an insured challenges an insurer's decision refusing to pre-certify treatment recommended by
a patient's physician, external review laws typically require the insurer to
submit the question to an outside expert or panel to review whether the treatment is medically necessary. If the external reviewer decides the recommended treatment is medically necessary, the insurer must pay for the treatment. See, e.g., Moran, 536 U.S. at 361; Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex.
Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d at 526. See generally J. S. Andresen, Is Utilization Review the Practiceof Medicine? Implications for Managed Care Administrators,
19 J. LEGAL MED. 431 (1998); Patricia Butler & Karl Polzer, Private Sector
Health Coverage: Variation in Consumer Protection Under ERISA and State
Law (1996) (National Health Policy Forum, George Washington University)
(discussing utilization review decisions).
75. The THCLA exempts insurers from liability for prescribed treatment
that falls outside the insurance policy coverage. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 88.002(d). That is, if the insurance entity denies a claim for reasons that do not involve the exercise of some medical judgment, such as a
statute of limitations violation, the THCLA does not apply.
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sion. 6 The specific preemption issue presented in Davila involved
the federal court's "complete preemption" removal jurisdiction to
hear an action premised on state law and filed in state court.77
Complete preemption operates as an exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule provides
that, for federal question jurisdiction purposes, federal courts only
examine the plaintiffs complaint to determine whether it presents
a federal claim for relief." The plaintiff is considered the master of
his or her lawsuit, and if only state law theories are pursued (in
good faith)," the fact that federal preemption of state law may
arise as an affirmative defense to the state law action does not allow a defendant to remove the state-filed action to federal court.8"
The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule, however. In the rare circumstances where
federal courts determine that Congress intended a federal remedy
to provide the exclusive means of enforcing rights in a federally
regulated field, courts employ a legal fiction to convert state law
claims into federal claims, thereby creating federal question jurisdiction and authorizing removal of state-filed actions to federal
court.8 This exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is known
as the complete preemption doctrine, 2 and the Supreme Court has
76. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495-2500.
77. Id. at 2493.
78. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10 ("[Whether] a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the
jurisdictional statute, ... must be determined from what necessarily appears
in the plaintiffs statement of his own claim in the bill of declaration, unaided
by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is
thought the defendant may interpose.") (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S.
74, 75-76 (1914)).
79. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[Tlhe party
who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon."). See also
FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22 ("[1It is an independent corollary of the wellpleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to
plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.").
80. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14 ("[Slince 1887 it has been settled
law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.").
81. See id. at 22-26; Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 1998).
82. The Supreme Court first established the complete preemption exception
to the well-pleaded complaint rule in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1968). Some
courts have called complete preemption a misnomer because the doctrine
really is a jurisdictional rule. See McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 51516 (5th Cir. 1998); Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plans, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482,
1487 (7th Cir. 1996). While it is true that the complete preemption doctrine
only operates in the circumstance of a defendant's attempt to remove a statefiled action to federal court, the underlying basis for imposing federal question
jurisdiction is the implied preemption of state law remedies.

20051

State Regulationof Insured PlansAfter Davila

ruled that the doctrine applies in ERISA actions.83 While complete
preemption arises in the context of removal jurisdiction, removal
to federal court based upon a predominant federal remedy under
the complete preemption doctrine necessarily requires that courts
determine the scope of congressional intent to supersede state law.
The parameters of a federal law's preemption of state law can
be expressly detailed in the federal statute or can arise by implication, s' but in either case, preemption analysis, including complete
preemption analysis, inherently seeks to determine congressional
intent.' Whether express or implied, the scope of a federal statute's preemption of state law falls into one of two categories, according to the Supreme Court's traditional preemption formula,
conflict preemption or field preemption." Conflict preemption applies where Congress intends a federal law to supersede only state
laws that directly conflict with the federal statute,87 or where enforcement of a state law would operate as an obstacle to achieving
the purposes of the federal act.' Under conflict preemption, state
laws that regulate in the same field as a federal law, but which
merely supplement or compliment the federal law, are enforceable.'
Field preemption is much broader than conflict preemption.
When Congress intends to occupy a particular field of regulation,
the federal act preempts all state laws operating in the field, even
state laws that merely supplement or compliment the purposes of
83. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-64. See also Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22-26 (discussing the possible application of the complete
preemption doctrine in ERISA cases, but holding that ERISA does not completely preempt claims by a party who does not have standing to sue under
ERISA). See generally Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A
Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927, 928 (1996).
84. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
85. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 738 ("In deciding
whether a federal law preempts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue. Preemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure
and purpose.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). See also Travelers,
514 U.S. at 655.
86. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
87. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
88. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985) ("Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or when state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.") (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
89. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 229-31.
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the federal enactment.' Courts infer congressional intent to occupy the field of regulation in a particular subject area where the
federal statute regulates the subject so comprehensively that it
can reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to block the
states from intervening in the subject area, or when the subject of
the regulation is peculiarly within federal authority.91 In applying
field preemption, whether by adherence to Congress' express instructions or by inference, courts must also identify the boundaries
of the field Congress intended the federal law to occupy."
The Supreme Court's disagreement with the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Davila illustrates the difference between application of conflict preemption and field preemption in the context
of a defendant's removal of a state-filed lawsuit under the complete preemption doctrine. The Supreme Court had previously declared that all state-filed claims that fall "within the scope" of
ERISA section 502 may be removed to federal court.93 The
Roark/Davila litigation, then, produced divergent views of what
"within the scope" means.
In Roark v. Humana,Inc. ,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
utilized implied conflict preemption principles to analyze an insurer's suggestion that Congress intended ERISA to preempt all
state law remedies that fall within the scope of ERISA section
502."5 Based upon specific language in prior Supreme Court opinions, the Court of Appeals found that ERISA only preempts state
law remedies that "duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA
§ 502(a)."' Since the tort remedy provided under the THCLA did
not duplicate any of the remedies available under ERISA section
502, the Fifth Circuit ruled that ERISA did not completely preempt the plan participants' state law claims arising from an
90. See id. at 230. See generally S. Candace Hoke, Preemption,Pathologies
and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1991).
91. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
92. See Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. at 517. See also Bogan,
ProtectingPatientRights, supra note 8, at 960-63.
93. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding the
Texas wrongful discharge tort conflicts with ERISA's enforcement provision
because state law remedy duplicates elements of a claim under ERISA); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64. See also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 390 U.S. at 559-60 (LMRA section 301 completely preempts any state law
cause of action that comes within the scope of the federal claim and necessarily arises under federal law).
94. 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (2004). Roark is the lower court case name for several
actions presenting similar ERISA preemption questions involving THCLA
claims that were consolidated for hearing in the Fifth Circuit. Only Juan
Davila's case versus Aetna Health, Inc. and Ruby Calad's claim versus Cigna
Healthcare of Texas, Inc. proceeded on to resolution in the Supreme Court.

95. Id. at 305.
96. See id. at 310-11 (citing Moran, 536 U.S. at 379). See also IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. at 142-44.
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ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.97 Essentially, the Fifth
Circuit held that the phrase "within the scope" means "duplicate.""8
In Davila, however, the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA's
civil enforcement provision supersedes more state law remedies
than just those that duplicate the relief afforded in section 502.
The Davila opinion proceeds at length to describe complete preemption and to explore the intended scope of implied preemption
under ERISA section 502. In contrast to the Court of Appeals,
however, Justice Thomas' opinion concludes that Congress intended ERISA to occupy the field of all plan participant remedies
arising in connection with an employee benefit plan.' Justice
Thomas reasoned that ERISA nullified the plan participants'
THCLA claims because ERISA section 502 preempts "any state
law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the
ERISA civil enforcement remedy... .""' Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase "within the scope"
means something broader than to "duplicate," but the Davila
Court put no boundaries on how much broader the scope of ERISA
section 502 might be.'0 '
Consistent with traditional conflict preemption analysis, the
97. Roark, 307 F.3d at 305, 309-11.
98. See id. at 310-11 ("States may not duplicate the causes of action listed
in ERISA § 502(a). This is, essentially, the test employed for 'complete preemption.'").
99. See Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2498-2500.
100. Id. at 2495. Interestingly, Justice Thomas defined the Court's approach
as applying implied conflict preemption rules, however, Justice Thomas' opinion clearly employed field preemption rules (comprehensiveness) and reached
a field preemption conclusion (ERISA section 502 preempts all state law
remedies that "duplicate, supplement, or supplant" ERISA's remedies). Id.
101. Arguably, in the Supreme Court's first discussion of complete preemption jurisdiction under ERISA, the Court did establish at least two boundaries
to the field of state law claims completely preempted by ERISA. In Franchise
Tax Board, the Court held that a state taxing authority's suit against an
ERISA plan was not completely preempted by ERISA because the state
agency prosecuting the claim was not one of the entities (plan participant or
beneficiary, plan fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor) that had standing to
bring a suit under ERISA section 502. 463 U.S. at 25. Additionally, the Court
remarked that the field of state law claims impliedly preempted by ERISA
section 502 was also limited by ERISA's savings clause:
The phrasing of § 502(a) is instructive. Section 502(a) specifies which
persons-participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor-may bring actions for particular kinds of relief.... Itdoes not
purport to reach every question relating to plans covered by ERISA.
Furthermore, § 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C § 1132(b)(2)(A) [the savings clause], makes clear that Congress did not intend to pre-empt entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans. With important,
but express limitations, it states that "nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."
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Fifth Circuit in Roark would have allowed state law remedies to
supplement ERISA's express civil remedies, so long as such remedies were not directly duplicative of ERISA section 502. The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit, and incorporating language familiar from field preemption jargon, held that ERISA
preempts even supplementary and complementary state law
remedies that do not directly conflict with section 502 remedies,
and which arguably advance Congress' overarching purpose in enacting ERISA to protect workers rights to receive promised benefits. 102

A number of questions arise from Justice Thomas' application
of implied preemption principles to conclude that ERISA completely preempts the Texas statutory tort remedy against ERISA
plan insurers. °3 The most intriguing question, which Justice Thomas largely ignored, is the contribution ERISA's express preemption language should have on the complete preemption analysis.
In ERISA, where Congress included an express provision to
signal its preemptive intentions, one might expect that a court
would trust the statute's specific preemption language to influence
its analysis of congressional intent to supersede state law remedies. The Supreme Court, however, has applied a version of statutory construction in ERISA cases that puts the cart before the
horse. Beginning with Pilot Life, and then thoughtlessly repeated
in Davila, the Court has determined that the comprehensiveness
of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme should "inform" the Court's
interpretation of ERISA's express preemption language, rather
than applying the statute's express preemption language to inform
the Court's interpretation of the scope of implied preemption arising from ERISA section 502.04
In Pilot Life, the Court examined two arguments presented in
support of preemption: first, that ERISA expressly preempted the
subject state remedies law (under section 514) because the law "related to" an ERISA plan and was not saved from preemption as a
law that regulates insurance; and second, that ERISA impliedly
102. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
103. For example, Justice Thomas' opinion ignores the rule, re-invigorated in
Travelers, that courts should presume that Congress did not intend to supersede state law, particularly in areas of traditional state predominance, such as
insurance law. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55. Additionally, the express
language of ERISA section 514 recites that "nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which

regulates insurance.... ." ERISA's remedies provision, found at section 502, is
within "this subchapter," consequently, the unambiguous, plain meaning of

ERISA section 514 instructs that ERISA section 502 "shall [not] be construed"
to trump the savings clause. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner in Part and Supporting Respondent in Part at 23,
UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868). See generally
Bogan, supra note 63.
104. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52).
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preempted the state law remedy (under section 502) because the
federal statute included its own comprehensive enforcement provision." 5 In construing a statute, it is elementary that courts should
first look to the language of the act to glean Congress' intent.'0 In
analyzing the scope of a federal statute's possible preemption of
state law, it is equally elementary that a court should look first to
the statute's express preemption provision, if it contains one, to
determine the scope of Congress' preemptive intentions. 7 When a
court examines a statute which contains express preemption language, but also senses further preemptive intentions based on
some other, non-preemption, statutory provision,"' it also seems
elementary that a court should examine the suggestion of preemption arising from the non-preemption language in concert with the
express preemption provision in an attempt to harmonize the inference of preemption with Congress' express preemption instructions."° In such a circumstance, where a court seeks to determine
the scope of implied preemption arising from a statute that also
contains express preemption language, I suggest that a court
should consult the express preemption language to "inform" its interpretation of the scope of implied preemption-it should not be
the other way around.
In Davila, the Supreme Court blundered when it parroted Pilot Life and decided that its perception of a broad intent to preempt arising by inference from the comprehensiveness of ERISA's
remedies provision trumps ERISA's express savings clause." Instead, the Court should have consulted the statute's express pre105. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987) (No 85-1043), availableat LEXIS at 1985 U.S. Briefs 1043.
106. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985) (observing that when interpreting statutes, a court "begin[s] with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose").
107. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 740 (quoting Park
'N Fly, Inc. v. DollarPark and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194).
108. In Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that
implied preemption principles, notably conflict or field preemption analysis,
apply in ERISA actions as tools to examine congressional intent to preempt, in
addition to Congress' express preemption instructions. See also John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1993).
109. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510
U.S. at 98 (stating that while ERISA's savings clause "leaves room for complementary or dual federal and state regulation," ERISA "calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes cannot be harmonized or accommodated").
110. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 ("As this Court stated in Pilot Life, 'our
understanding of [§ 514(b)(2)(A)] [the savings clause] must be informed by the
legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions provided by
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).'") (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52). Recall that the Pilot Life Court ruled that the state law at issue in that case was
not a law that regulates insurance; consequently, the Davila Court's heavy
reliance on Pilot Life is particularly misplaced.
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emption provision, and in particular the savings clause since the
issue in Davila involved a state insurance law remedy, and it
should have attempted to harmonize the scope of implied preemption under section 502 with ERISA's express preemption language.
In Pilot Life, the Court's emphasis was wrong because the Court
allowed the inference of preemption arising from a nonpreemption provision to direct its construction of express preemption language on the specific question of the statute's preemption
of state law. In Davila, the Court went even further astray because Justice Thomas' opinion did not even pretend to incorporate
ERISA's express preemption language into the mix when it ruled
that ERISA impliedly preempted a state insurance law."'
In Davila, if the Court had attempted to harmonize implied
preemption under section 502 with the section 514(b)(2)(A) exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance, instead
of merely dismissing the express provision as inferior to section
502 implied preemption, an easy solution would have been apparent. If we assume that the comprehensiveness of section 502 indicates a congressional intent to occupy the field of civil remedies
arising in connection with an employee benefit plan, the question
still remains: What are the boundaries to the field Congress intended ERISA to occupy? The Court continues to assert that Congress intended ERISA remedies to be exclusive,"' but that tells us
very little. If a plan rents office space, did Congress intend section
502 to preempt state landlord-tenant law?
When a court invokes field preemption analysis, it must
somehow define or limit the scope of the preempted field. If the
Davila Court had recognized that there must be some boundaries
111. See id. at 2500 (chastising the plan participants for suggesting that the
THCLA regulates insurance within ERISA's savings clause "for the first time

in their brief to this Court" and then perfunctorily dismissing the savings
clause argument). Lower courts have generally examined complete preemption
removal jurisdiction solely according to section 502 implied preemption analysis. By ignoring ERISA's express preemption language when evaluating a motion to remand, federal courts put themselves in a box if the state law remedy
under consideration is a law that regulates insurance. By failing to consider
how the savings clause might limit implied preemption under section 502,

courts routinely deny the motion to remand, tacitly agreeing that ERISA preempts the claim without ever taking the opportunity to consider ERISA's exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance. The better procedure is for courts to examine both implied preemption under section 502,

and the express preemption instructions of section 514 at the motion to remand stage. At that point a court would best be in position to avoid needlessly
hearing non-diverse, state-filed, and state law-controlled insurance disputes.
See Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 151 (2d
Cir. 1995). See also Hamilton v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., No. 01-585 c/w
01-650 Section: "J"(4), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6791, at *18 (E.D. La. May 17,

2001); Selby v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Civ. 9283 (RLC), 2000 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 1495, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000).
112. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
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to the exclusive field of remedies occupied by ERISA, the Court
could have harmonized its interpretation of section 502 with section 514 by applying the savings clause to define at least one of the
boundaries of the field occupied by section 502-that is, the Court
could have, and should have, held that the field of remedies occupied by ERISA section 502 does not include state insurance law
remedies."'3
In Davila, the Court's failure to consult ERISA's express preemption language to at least determine the boundaries of the field
Congress intended ERISA to preempt caused the Supreme Court
to incongruously rule that the inference of preemption arising
from ERISA's civil enforcement provision was a better indicator of
Congress' preemptive intentions than the express
preemption pro4
vision Congress included within the statute.1
Davila is wrongly decided. That said, following Davila, at
least there is no longer any ambiguity about one long-contested
ERISA preemption issue-ERISA nullifies state insurance bad
faith laws to the extent ERISA plan participants rely upon such
laws to seek extra-contractual damages from an insured ERISA
plan." However, because insurance bad faith laws do more than
offer individual consumers a tort remedy, we must now proceed to
examine what remaining impact state insurance bad faith laws
may have in the ERISA claims process after Davila.
IV.

BAD FAITH LAWS IN PLAN PARTICIPANT CLAIMS AFTER DAVILA

A. Bad FaithLaws Define Standardsof Conduct
Bad faith insurance laws come in many sizes and shapes.
Some states enforce their insurance bad faith laws entirely
through the common law."6 The majority of states have enacted
113. See FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25.
114. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 ("The existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme demonstrates an 'overpowering federal policy' that determines the
interpretation of a statutory provision designed to save state law from being
pre-empted."); id. ("Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, thus,
even a state law that can be arguably characterized as 'regulating insurance'
will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA's remedial scheme."). But see Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25.
115. By this I mean there is no ambiguity under the arguments as presented, unless, of course, the Supreme Court fixes the mistakes it has made in
this area. Further, it must be noted that the Davila plan participants abandoned the issue of whether the ERISA plan sponsor's promise was to pay
health care costs or merely to pay for membership in the HMO. See Davila,
124 S. Ct. at 2497 n.2.
116. See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (1988)
(noting that individual remedy not available under California unfair insurance practices act, though the state Insurance Commissioner can pursue administrative remedies and individuals can pursue common law bad faith
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some version of the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Act.'17 Some states hold insurance companies to their duty of good
faith and fair dealing through a combination of statutory standards and common law claims." 8 Many states authorize individual
insurance consumers to enforce bad faith standards through civil
actions for extra-contractual damages, including punitive damages."9 Other states grant statutory treble damage remedies to insurance consumers. 2 Some states only allow the state Commissioner of Insurance or Attorney General to enforce the state's
insurance law standards established in statutory unfair insurance
practices laws."'
While the states vary in the remedies they authorize in response to insurer bad faith, one thing that all bad faith laws have
in common is that they establish standards of conduct insurers
must adhere to in their interactions with their insurance customers. In sum, insurance bad faith laws do two things: 1) they establish standards of behavior required of insurers; and 2) they provide some type of remedy against insurers who violate the
standards of behavior.
Davila establishes that ERISA impliedly preempts plan participant state law bad faith remedies because such state law
remedies, whether common law or statutory, "conflict" with
ERISA's civil enforcement provision."2 However, because state bad
faith insurance law standards of conduct have effect standing
alone-that is, absent the remedy, they still regulate insurancestate laws that establish standards of conduct for insurers do not
always implicate implied preemption under ERISA section 502.
Further, since bad faith laws that impose standards of insurer
conduct fit within ERISA's savings clause,"' such laws should
avoid express preemption under ERISA section 514. The question
then arises: What impact do state laws that impose standards of
claims). But cf Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 146 (Kan.
1980) (in first party claim, Kansas unfair insurance practices remedies preempt common law bad faith actions).
117. See UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (NAIC 1991), reprinted in ASHLEY, supra note 14, app. III, at appx-25.
118. See Moradi-Shalalv. Fireman'sFund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d at 66 (discuss-

ing administrative remedies under state unfair insurance practices act and
common law claims available to individual insureds).
119. See, e.g., Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2004 Okla. LEXIS 49, at *10.

120. North Carolina authorizes either an individual common law action
seeking punitive damages for bad faith breach of an insurance contract, or a
statutory action for treble damages by enforcing the unfair insurance practices
statute through an individual action under the state's general unfair trade
practices statute. See Vazquez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. App.

2000).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 193-206.
122. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
123. See Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d at 1147-48. See also discussion of KAHP savings clause test in text accompanying notes 59-65, supra.
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conduct on insurance companies have on ERISA plan participant
benefit claims, if the bad faith laws cannot be enforced through individual state law remedies?
I suggest that state bad faith laws that establish standards of
insurer conduct should assist plan participants in overcoming
ERISA plan insurer claim denials in the common circumstance
where courts defer to insurer actions under an arbitrary or capricious standard of review. Before we examine how state bad faith
laws may establish an insurer's arbitrary and capricious behavior,
we should first recall the deferential standard of review process
common in ERISA plan participant benefit claims.
B. The Deferential Standardof Review in ERISA Benefit Claims
The application of a deferential standard of review in ERISA
claims litigation, along with the preemption of state consumer protection laws and remedies, make ERISA a frequent target for consumer-protection advocates' legislative reform efforts.' Additionally, preemption of state laws and application of a deferential
review standard engender much hand-wringing by judges. 5 (and
an occasional justice') who bemoan the unfairness of the benefit
claim processes developed under ERISA. While the implementation of deferential review in ERISA claims litigation lacks a sound
legal foundation," 7 every federal circuit adheres to the practice,
with some variation in the details," 8 due to a dicta pronouncement
in the 1989 Supreme Court opinion, FirestoneTire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch "
In Firestone, a number of former employees challenged Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'s ("Firestone") interpretation of a clause
in an employee termination pay plan, which Firestone sponsored
for its workers. The severance plan promised benefits to any workers who lost their jobs at Firestone due to a "reduction in work
124. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993); Bi-

partisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723,
106th Cong. (1999) (Patient Bill of Rights).
125. See DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J., concurring); Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 321 F.3d 83, 106-10 (2d
Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting); Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla.,
Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1271 (10th Cir. 1996); Graham v. L & B Realty Advisor,
Inc., No. 3:02-CV-0293-N, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17272, at *12-14 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 30, 2003); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53
(D. Mass. 1997); Jordon v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D.
Ala. 1988).
126. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503-04 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
127. See Bogan, supra note 26. See also Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradoxof
the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 727 (2004).
128. See generally, Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in
ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2001).
129. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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force." 30 When Firestone sold its Plastics Division to Occidental
Petroleum Company ("Occidental"), workers within the Plastics
Division who lost their jobs with Firestone sought benefits under
the severance plan, even though Occidental immediately hired
many of the workers to perform substantially the same jobs they
had been performing for Firestone.' Firestone felt that the contract phrase "reduction in work force" did not include workers who
transferred to a new employer as part of a corporate
restructuring,
32
but who never actually missed a day of work.
Firestone's interpretation of the "reduction in work force"
phrase resulted in the denial of severance benefits; however, an
equally reasonable interpretation of the phrase would have allowed the former employees to obtain the benefits. Ultimately, the
legally significant question in Firestonewas not finding the correct
interpretation of the contested contract language, but deciding
who had the power to make the interpretation. Rather than just
urging its construction as correct, Firestone argued that it had the
sole right to interpret the plan contract because it was acting in
the capacity of ERISA plan administrator when it construed the
plan language contrary to the workers' interests.
Firestone's assertion of exclusive authority to interpret plan
provisions must have seemed audacious to the former Firestone
workers, since the plan itself merely identified Firestone as a
party to the employment contract-it was not judge, jury, arbitrator, or administrative law judge, and there was no language in the
plan contract granting discretionary powers to Firestone. 3 ' The
workers should be excused for their lack of ERISA sophistication,
however, since Firestone itself apparently did not understand that
ERISA governed the severance benefit plan." Consequently, the
written termination pay plan did not reference ERISA and it did
not identify anyone as an ERISA plan administrator. Firestone
only served in the capacity of plan administrator because ERISA's
default rule appoints the plan sponsor to act as plan administrator
when an employee benefit plan fails to identify a plan administrator."' 5 Regardless of how it became the plan administrator, Firestone argued that as plan administrator, the court could only interfere with its construction of plan provisions if Firestone acted
M

130. See id. at 105-06.
131. See id. at 105. But see Brief for Respondents, at 2 n.1, Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054), availableat LEXIS at
1987 U.S. Briefs 1054 (asserting that Occidental did not hire all the former
Firestone employees and suggesting losses in benefits resulted to those who
were retained).
132. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 106.
133. See id. at 112.

134. Firestone conceded that it did not know ERISA governed its severance
benefits plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105.
135. ERISA § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii).
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arbitrarily or capriciously.
Firestone urged the Supreme Court to apply the deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to its decisions as
plan administrator by analogizing ERISA benefit claims to individual worker claims filed under section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 137 Several courts had previously
interpreted LMRA section 302(c) to authorize an individual union
worker's breach of trust lawsuit against the trustees of a collectively-bargained benefits plan." Courts that recognized this implied LMRA remedy limited their review of the trustees' discretionary actions because trust law dictates that courts examine
trustee discretionary acts only to assure that discretionary decisions are free from arbitrary and capricious actions. 9 Since LMRA
section 302(c) claims sound in trust law, and because Congress incorporated much of LMRA trust law principles into ERISA, Firestone contended that a trust law-based deferential standard of review applied in ERISA benefit claims, just like in LMRA section
302(c) actions." °
The Supreme Court rejected Firestone's argument that a deferential standard of review applied because the Firestone severance plan did not grant discretionary powers to the plan administrator.' However, the Firestoneopinion offered a road map to plan
sponsors who wanted to prevent courts from meddling into their
employee benefits business. Despite the Court's rejection of the
LMRA section 302(c) trust law analogy, the Supreme Court instructed, nevertheless, that trust law did generally govern ERISA
plan administration (even though the Firestone severance plan
was not funded through a trust).' Further, the Firestone Court
opined that under trust law, courts should defer to an ERISA plan
136. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109-12 (arguing that the interpretation of the
terms of a trust is an inherently discretionary function). See also Brief for Petitioner at 5-20, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)
(No. 87-1054), available at LEXIS at 1987 U.S. Briefs 1054.
137. See LMRA § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c).
138. LMRA section 301 provides a breach of contract remedy, but individual
workers are not granted standing to sue under LMRA section 301, which only
authorizes unions and employers to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
140. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109. Firestone did not separately fund its severance plan-that is, it did not set aside assets in a trust to pay the promised
benefits, nor did it purchase insurance to fund the severance plan. Additionally, because the severance benefits were paid out of Firestone's operating
capital, every decision Firestone made as plan administrator to deny benefits
resulted in a dollar-for-dollar gain for Firestone, the plan sponsor. See Bruch v
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
141. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 112, 115.
142. Interestingly, the Court first observed that Congress did not intend to
wholly incorporate LMRA trust law into ERISA. See id. at 109.
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administrator's discretionary decision-making if an ERISA plan
specifically empowers the plan administrator with discretionary
authority." Since the Firestone plan failed to expressly grant discretionary powers to the plan administrator, the Court held that a
de novo standard of review applied, but the legacy of Firestone is
the rule that courts must defer to ERISA plan administrators in
their exercise of specifically assigned discretionary authority.'"
Predictably, a great many ERISA plan sponsors added grants
of discretion to their plan administrators after Firestone,4' and following the Supreme Court's suggestion in Firestone, lower courts
now defer to an ERISA plan administrator's discretionary acts in
interpreting plan language and in deciding benefit claims, so long
as the necessary grant of discretionary powers is included in the
plan, and so long as the plan administrator does not abuse its discretion.' 6 Applying this deferential review standard to ERISA
claims, courts limit the judicial role to evaluating whether the
plan administrator's "interpretation was made rationally and in
good faith-not whether it was right." 47
Further complicating the ERISA standard of review issue is
the fact that in their application of the deferential standard in
ERISA claims, courts talk trust law, but actually apply an administrative law-style of deferential review." Under the ERISA model
143. See id. at 115 (noting also the exception that courts must account for
any trustee conflict of interest as a factor when it decides whether the trustee's actions were arbitrary and capricious). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 187.

144. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. See generally Kennedy, supra note 128,
at 1114-16.
145. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citing John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 207).

146. Most courts equate the "abuse of discretion" standard of review with the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1558 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990). But see
Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996).
147. See Brown v. Ret. Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d 521,
529 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 410
(2d Cir. 1977)). See also Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d at 870 ("A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is 'not just clearly incorrect, but downright unreasonable.'") (quoting Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th
Cir. 1990)); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1977) (courts defer
to the discretionary actions of a trustee so long as its conduct is not "arbitrary,
capricious, or made in bad faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or [is]
erroneous on a question of law").
148. See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan,
195 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[W~e have held that courts may treat welfare benefit plans just like administrative law judges implementing the Social
Security disability-benefit program."). But see Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co.,
205 F.3d 327, 332 7th Cir. (2000) ("What may have mislead courts in some
cases is the analogy between judicial review of an ERISA plan administrator's
decision to deny disability benefits and judicial review of the denial of such
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as applied by the courts, which actually equates the ERISA plan
administrator with an administrative law judge, not a trustee,
courts typically examine only the plan administrator's claim file to
determine whether, at the time the plan administrator denied a
claim, the "administrative record" contained evidence to support
the plan administrator's exercise of discretion.'49 Courts usually do
not allow plan participants to offer further evidence in support of
his or her claim, 5 ' and courts usually do not hear live witness testimony in an ERISA benefit claim, even when courts conduct a
bench trial."' Additionally, courts do not allow plan participants to
conduct discovery, unless there is a question whether the plan
administrator was operating under a conflict of interest."' Finally,
courts usually deny plan participants the right to a jury trial in
plan participant benefits claims, ostensibly because trust law
permeates ERISA, and trust law is governed under equitable principles."
Court deference to an insurance company's claim denial as if
benefits by the Social Security Administration."); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d at 1564 ("We express caution, however, at the
wholesale importation of administrative agency concepts into the review of
ERISA fiduciary decisions. Use of the administrative agency analogy may,
ironically, give too much deference to ERISA fiduciaries."). See also DeBofsky,
supra note 127.
149. See, e.g., Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990).
But see Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d at 332. In reality, no 'administrative record" is created when a plan administrator/insurer investigates
a claim. DeBofsky, supra note 127, at 739. There are seldom sworn affidavits,
or deposition transcripts in the claims file, which should concern courts that
enter "summary judgment" under the summary adjudication process developed by federal courts to deal with the glut of ERISA benefits claims. See id.
at 746-47; Donald T. Bogan, The UnsupportedDelegation of Conflict Adjudication in ERISA Claims Under the Guise of JudicialDeference, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
21 (2004).
150. The plan participant can submit documents, including medical records,
affidavits, and expert witness reports to the plan administrator for its consideration, but once the plan administrator makes its final decision to deny benefits, its file is closed and courts do not usually allow the plan participant or the
plan administrator to offer new evidence in court. Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, JudicialReview of Denial of Health Care Benefits Under Employee
Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
(29 U.S.C.A. 1132(a)(1)(B)-Post Firestone Cases, 128 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 48
(Supp.2003).
151. See Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating that a "judge decides cases as a trial on the papers when
the parties agree to stipulated facts").
152. See generally Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1083.
153. See generally Annotation, Plaintiffs Right to Jury Trial in Civil Action
Under 502(a)(1)(B) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
1132(a)(1)(B), 56 A.L.R. FED. 880 (Supp. 2001). But see Bogan, supra note 26,
at 685-93. See also Bona v. Barasch, 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4186 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003) (jury trial awarded in ERISA claim because claimant sought legal relief).
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the insurer was an administrative law judge, coupled with a
court's refusal to enforce the rules of civil procedure in allowing
discovery and in conducting a trial, as if the plan participant had
previously enjoyed the due process of law in an administrative
trial, often render an ERISA plan participant's section 502(a)(1)(B)
suit to recover benefits due under an insured plan an illusory remedy.
C. ERISA Plan InsurersAbuse Their Discretionwhen They
Violate State InsuranceLaw Standardsof Conduct
State unfair insurance practices statutes typically define
many unfair practices in such broad terms that it is difficult to define specific behaviors that are always objectionable.TM However,
where the plan participant can establish that a plan insurer violated a state bad faith law in the process of denying a claim for
benefits, for example, by interpreting ambiguous policy language
in its own favor155 or by failing to conduct an adequate investiga154. State unfair insurance practices laws, patterned on the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Model Regulation (NAIC 1981), reprinted in ASHLEY, supra note 14, app. II, at appx-17, typically define the following generally stated
practices as unfair (or, in common law parlance, in violation of an insurer's
duty of good faith and fair dealing):
unreasonable withholding of payments due under an insurance policy;
failing to act in good faith in discharging the insurer's contractual responsibilities;
refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy;
unreasonable delay in paying claims where there is no honest doubt
about the insurer's liability.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1250.5 (2000). See also Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232 (1972) (requiring insured to
bear the expense of proving facts which are not reasonably in dispute). The
difficulty in applying state bad faith insurance law standards when the facts
are not obvious arises from the common practice of denying plan participants
the right to conduct discovery in ERISA claims litigation, and the practice of
denying plan participants an evidentiary hearing. See generally Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1102 (stating absent an opportunity to discover bad faith violations and to present evidence of such bad faith in court when questions of
fact predominate, it may be only in the limited circumstances that would support a summary judgment that a plan participant will be able to press a court
to overturn an ERISA claim denial because the insurer's bad faith established
an arbitrary and capricious violation). See generally Kennedy, supra note 128,
at 1102.
155. See, e.g., Harrell v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 75, 79 (Okla. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that an insurer acted in bad faith when it interpreted an ambiguous pre-existing condition clause in insurance policy in its own favor in
order to deny coverage); Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127,
1137 (Ariz. 1982) (patently ambiguous policy provision), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1070 (1982). See also Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d at 388
(insurer acted in bad faith when it deliberately misinterpreted medical records
to avoid coverage). See generally, ASHLEY, supra note 14, § 5.11 n.32.
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tion , courts should
accept the bad faith violation as a per se
157
abuse of discretion.
Despite the difficulty a plan participant may have in proving
bad faith in ERISA cases that prohibit discovery, ban evidence,
and discount the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, even
when a statute defines standards very broadly, many states have
interpretive case law that does define explicit behaviors as violative of state law." In such circumstances, a plan participant may
be able to establish some bad faith violations as a matter of law
based upon facts admitted in the plan administrator's claims
file. 9 For purposes of this analysis, I will focus on one common
practice that does lend itself to a summary adjudication of bad
faith as a matter of law. The claims settlement practice that I suggest violates most state insurance law bad faith standards is the
insurance company practice of interpreting ambiguous policy provisions in their own favor to deny claims."
156. See ASHLEY, supra note 14, § 5:08 (gathering cases).
157. This is not really a novel suggestion because federal courts have consistently defined arbitrary and capricious behavior or abuses of discretion in
ERISA cases in language that incorporates or mirrors the catch-all "bad-faith"
term which the states have utilized to describe unreasonable insurance company conduct. Additionally, the description of unfair practices contained in
state unfair insurance practices laws often is couched in terms of behavior
that is unreasonable. See supra text accompanying note 154. My analysis here
merely frees federal courts to examine historic state court bad faith precedents
to find concrete examples of specific behaviors that are "unreasonable," or "unfair," or "arbitrary and capricious." See, e.g., Brown v. Ret. Comm. of Briggs &
Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d at 529 (stating ERISA courts applying deferential
standard of review only care that the plan insurer's "interpretation was made
rationally and in good faith-not whether it was right") (quoting Riley v.
MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d at 410); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d at 1371
(courts defer to the discretionary actions of a trustee so long as its conduct is
not "arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith, not supported by substantial
evidence, or [is] erroneous on a question of law").
158. See ASHLEY, supra note 14.
159. This sounds like a summary judgment standard, assuming the file contains sworn affidavits, sworn answers to interrogatories, admissions in pleadings, and deposition transcripts, but most courts disregard the niceties of
summary judgment in ERISA cases. See DeBofsky, supra note 127, at 743-46.
Courts routinely enter summary judgment in ERISA claims based upon the
'administrative record," but the administrative record is rarely, if ever, compiled under the rules of evidence-witnesses are not sworn, no evidentiary
foundation is established to assure that documents contained in the fie would
be admissible, and there is seldom deposition testimony. At most, the file occasionally contains some sworn affidavits. While the parties may stipulate
that that the file submitted to the court contains all of the materials reviewed
by the plan administrator, there is typically no stipulation as to the admissibility of the
contents
of the
file. See generally Kennedy,
supra note 128.
160. See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995);
Employees' Benefit Ass'n v. Grissett, 732 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 1998); Sanders v.
Home Indem. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1345 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Harrell v. Old Am.
Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 75 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
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In the ERISA context, state bad faith laws that impose standards of conduct on insurers should apply to plan insurers in similar fashion to the notice-prejudice rule in Ward, and to the external review law at issue in Moran, as previously discussed. 61 State
insurance bad faith laws that proscribe standards of conduct, and
particularly standards of conduct targeting the claims settlement
process, reasonably fit within the KHAP two-factor savings clause
test. 162 First, bad faith standards of behavior, whether defined by
statute or developed under the common law of most states, only
apply to the insurance industry." Second, state insurance laws
defining an insurer's standards of conduct substantially impact
the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured
1
because such laws add policy terms to the insurance contract.'
Recall here that the insurance rule of bad faith interpretation
of an insurance contract is different than the general rule of contact interpretation known as contraproferentum. The rule of contra proferentum requires courts, in de novo trials, to construe ambiguous contract language against the interpretation, even a
reasonable interpretation, offered by the drafter of the ambiguous
language, and in favor of a reasonable interpretation offered by
the non-drafter of the ambiguous language. Contra proferentum
Co., 647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982). See also
Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d at 376 (deliberate misinterpretation of medical records to avoid coverage). See generally, ASHLEY, supra
note 14, § 5.11 n.32.
161. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-58 and 66-69, supra.
162. See KAHP, 538 U.S. at 341-42 (holding state laws regulate insurance if
they are specifically directed toward "entities engaged in insurance" and if
they "substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and the insured"). See discussion in text accompanying notes 59-65, supra.
163. See Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d at 1147-48 (holding the
Montana unfair insurance practices statute is a law that regulates insurance
under KAHP two-factor test). Compare Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 41 (holding that
Mississippi's bad faith remedy is available for any breach of contract, not just
the tortious breach of an insurance contract), with Lewis v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999) (declaring that Oklahoma common law bad faith remedy is available only in claims against the insurance industry).
164. KAHP establishes that the savings clause does not apply only to state
insurance laws that transfer risk, as most courts had interpreted the old
three-factor McCarran-Ferguson Act test, which KAHP overruled. See KAHP,
538 U.S. at 342. See also discussion in text accompanying notes 59-65, supra.
165. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 88G (3d ed.
1990) ("The common sense basis for the rule [of contra proferentum] is that,
where language may be reasonably interpreted in a way that favors the
drafter or in a way that favors the non-drafter, the latter interpretation will be
preferred since the drafter had control over the language and may even have
left the language less than clear so as not to alert the other party to certain
troublesome possibilities of which the drafter now seeks a favorable interpretation. Since the drafter is responsible for the unclear language, it should be
interpretated against him even if he intended no advantage to himself in
drafting it."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
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is a common law rule that courts apply in a lawsuit between two
parties to a contract where each party has the right to advocate for
its favored interpretation. The purpose behind the contra proferentum rule is to encourage drafters of contracts to write clear contract language so that disputes, leading to lawsuits, can be
avoided."
While some courts apply the contra proferenturn rule in
ERISA benefit claims as a matter of ERISA common law, particularly where the court reviews the matter de novo,"67 the rule must
be distinguished from the insurance bad faith standard involving
interpretations of insurance contracts. The insurance bad faith
standard provides that when an insured submits an insurance
coverage claim to his or her insurer, prior to any lawsuit, the insurer acts in bad faith if it interprets ambiguous policy language
in its own favor and against the insured in order to deny coverage." The insurance law duty of good faith and fair dealing requires one party to an insurance contract-the insurance company-to interpret the contract in favor of the other party to the
contract-the insured-before any lawsuit has been inititated. The
insurance bad faith rule, therefore, prohibits the insurance company from advocating for its own interests, but rather requires the
insurer to respect the insured's reasonable expectations and to
credit those reasonable expectations in the interpretation of ambiguous insurance policy language.
To the extent that state law enforces the insurance rule that
an insurer acts in bad faith if it interprets ambiguous insurance
policy language against the insured, that state insurance rule is a
law that regulates insurance which falls within ERISA's savings
clause exception to preemption. As we have seen in Ward and
Moran, state laws that regulate insurer conduct can be enforced
166. The common parental response to children who fight over who gets the
bigger piece of pie presents a good parallel here. As we all know, the child that

does not cut the pie gets to choose which piece of pie to eat-this rule tends to
provide an incentive to the child that cuts the pie to be careful that each piece
is the same size. Similarly, where ambiguous language in a contract will be

construed against the drafter, the drafter has an incentive to be clear.
167. See Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1992)
(en banc); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.
1991); Olson v. Troike, 959 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Some courts also apply the contra proferentum rule in ERISA cases applying a deferential standard of review. See Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80 (4th

Cir. 1993); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990);
Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991); Kekis

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Cf. Finley
v. Special Agents Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992) (contraproferentum rule does not apply); Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1992)
(contraproferentum rule does not apply).
168. See, e.g., Harrell v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 75 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that an insurer acted in bad faith when it misinterpreted a preexisting condition clause in an insurance policy in order to defeat coverage).
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by ERISA plan participants only through the remedies available
under ERISA section 502."9 When an ERISA plan grants discretionary powers to a plan administrator, triggering a deferential
standard of review, an insurer's violation of state unfair insurance
practice laws establishes the insurer's abuse of discretion, per se,
because courts equate "arbitrary
and capricious" and "abuse of
170
discretion" with "bad faith."
For example, assume that a state interprets an unfair claims
settlement practices statute to prohibit an insurance company
from construing ambiguous policy language in its own favor. Assume also that the challenged plan language in Firestone, "reduction in work force," was contained in an insured ERISA severance
plan. Finally, assume that this hypothetical plan named the hypothetical insurer as plan administrator and that the plan grants the
insurer/plan administrator discretion to interpret policy language
and sole discretion to decide benefit claims.
A plan participant's challenge the hypothetical insurer/plan
administrator's interpretation of the "reduction in work force"
phrase in its own favor would likely be denied if a court applied an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, as suggested in Firestone, absent a contribution from ERISA's savings clause. While
the insurer/plan administrator's construction of the policy language, finding that the termination of the workers due to the sale
of a part of the employer's business does not trigger benefits under
the "reduction in work force" language, may be incorrect, a deferring court does not care whether the plan administrator reached
the right conclusion; it only cares that the insurer's interpretation
is not arbitrary. 7' However, if a court employed the state insurance bad faith rule prohibiting an insurer from construing ambiguous policy language against the insured, I suggest that a court
should reach a contrary result.
Because the plan participant invokes the insurance bad faith
law in an action to recover benefits due under ERISA section 502
(a)(1)(B), implied preemption of state law remedies does not apply.
169. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-58 and 66-69, supra.
170. See, e.g., Brown v. Ret. Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d

at 529 (stating ERISA courts applying deferential standard of review only care
that the plan insurer's "interpretation was made rationally and in good faithnot whether it was right") (quoting Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d at
410); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d at 1371 (equating "arbitrary [or] capricious"
with "bad faith"). See also de Freitas, supra note 150, §§ 32-34.
171. See, e.g., Glista v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 01-10202-GAO, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17457 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2003), rev'd and remanded, 378 F.3d
113 (1st Cir. 2004). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 124-153,
supra. In Firestone, the Supreme Court declared that de novo review applied,

but the Court did not decide the contract interpretation question on the merits. The Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the Third Circuit and
then to the district court to make that interpretation. See Firestone, 489 U.S.

at 107-08.
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Rather, like the notice-prejudice rule in Ward and the external review law in Moran, the state statute merely adds a term to the insured plan contract, even though the added term may direct the
outcome of the section 502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim. 72 A court evaluating this hypothetical claim under an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review, taking into account ERISA's savings clause,
should decide that the hypothetical insurer abused its discretion
in denying the claim because the insurer's violation of the state insurance law standards of behavior defines the insurer's practice of
favoring itself over its insured's when construing ambiguous contract terms as arbitrary and capricious, per se. In this hypothetical, the savings clause would dictate that the insurer construe the
"reduction in work force" language in favor of the workers (as required under most states' insurance laws) and the insurer's failure
to do so would violate the plan insurance policy, and would
amount to an abuse of discretion."'
A recent Tenth Circuit case, Fought v. UNUM Life Insurance
Co.,"" presents a good, complicated, and real fact pattern to further consider how a state insurance bad faith standard may impact a plan participant's claim for benefits due under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). In Fought, UNUM Life Insurance Company
("UNUM") issued an insurance policy to fund an ERISA-governed
group disability benefits plan. The insurance policy contained a
pre-existing condition exclusion which provided that: "Your plan
does not cover any disabilities caused by, contributed to by, or resulting from your... pre-existing condition." 7 Additionally, the
policy defined a pre-existing condition as any medical condition for
which the insured received medical treatment, consultation, care
or services in the three months just preceding the effective date of
the disability policy, or for which the insured had symptoms that
an ordinarily prudent person would have consulted a health care
provider. 76
Ms. Fought suffered from pre-existing coronary disease. Several months after the effective date of her UNUM disability coverage, Ms. Fought underwent first, angioplasty, and then elective
172. See 2 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 19:1,
at 19:2 to 19-4 (3d ed. 1995) ("Existing and valid statutory provisions enter
into and form a part of all contracts of insurance to which they are applica-

ble.").
173. Federal courts could reach the same result by further developing
ERISA common law, and particularly, a federal common law of contracts and
insurance law, where state law should serve as a predictive model. However, it
appears that courts are reluctant to apply a common law of contracts and insurance law to implement ERISA, due primarily to the Supreme Court's overbroad application of trust law in ERISA. See Bogan, supra note 26, at 636-37
n.30.
174. 379 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005).
175. See Fought, 379 F.3d at 999 (quoting the UNUM policy).

176. Id.
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coronary artery revascularization surgery to treat her heart condition. During surgery the doctors discovered that Ms. Fought suffered from a deformity in her sternum which required the surgeon
to employ a special procedure to close the surgical wound. Ms.
Fought's doctors anticipated that the post-operative course would
be "quite challenging" due to concern about the surgical wound.177
Ms. Fought was discharged with her wounds healing well and
with no evidence of infection. Subsequently the wound split open,
causing a second hospitalization. After the doctors administered
antibiotics, they again discharged Ms. Fought with dramatic improvement in the healing of the surgical wound. Within a month,
Ms. Fought was again admitted to the hospital, now suffering a
persistent staph infection that proved to be immune to antibiotic
treatment. As a result of the staph infection, Ms. Fought then underwent intensive-care treatment, numerous surgical procedures,
and was placed on a ventilator.
Ms. Fought submitted a claim under the UNUM insurance
policy for disability benefits arising from the persistent staph infection. UNUM denied the claim. UNUM interpreted the preexisting condition exclusion to cover disability resulting from the
staph infection, despite several treating physician reports which
declared that the staph infection and resulting disability were
separate and unrelated to the pre-existing coronary condition.'
UNUM concluded that, while "'the staph infection itself was not
present during the pre-existing condition period..., it was the result of surgery that was performed for a cardiac condition that was
present, diagnosed and treated during [the pre-existing condition]
time period.'"'79 An alternate construction of the pre-existing condition language, which appears equally reasonable, if not more reasonable, than the interpretion advanced by UNUM suggests that,
since Ms. Fought did not suffer from a staph infection within three
months prior to the effective date of the disability policy, she was
entitled to the disability benefits.
The district judge in Fought applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review because the plan sponsor granted the
administrator discretionary powers, though the district judge did
modify the deferential review standard to reflect UNUM's admitted conflict of interest while serving as both plan administrator
and payor of plan benefits. Given the deferential standard of review, the district court determined that UNUM's denial of benefits, based upon its interpretation of the pre-existing condition exclusion to include the attenuated causation of Ms. Fought's staph
177. Id.
178. One of the several doctor reports confusingly stated that Ms. Fought
was "totally disabled due to her heart condition. The staph infection was not a
pre-existing condition." Id. at 1000.
179. See id. at 1001.
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infection, was not unreasonable.' 80
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc in
Fought, examined the confusing state of the law on how a "sliding
scale" deferential standard of review should be applied in ERISA
benefit cases when the plan administrator suffers a conflict of interest.' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately reversed
the district court. In the process the Tenth Circuit created a new
two-factor test that may, or may not, help lower courts and parties
understand how to apply this confusing review standard in conflict
of interest cases.8 2 I suggest the Tenth Circuit could have followed
a much easier path to reach its conclusion that UNUM's claim denial was arbitrary and capricious. By applying state insurance bad
faith standards to UNUM's behavior, the Tenth Circuit could have
easily concluded that UNUM abused its discretion in denying Ms.
Fought's claim for benefits.
UNUM is an insurance company subject to state insurance
laws, including state law insurance bad faith standards." An insurer acts in bad faith when it interprets ambiguous policy language in its own favor and against an insured in order to deny
coverage. Under state insurance law, insurer standards of conduct,
whether described by the common law or detailed in an Unfair Insurance Practices law, are incorporated into every insurance contract."' When an insurer acts in bad faith under state law by interpreting ambiguous policy provisions in its own favor to deny
coverage, it also abuses it discretion under a deferential standard
of review because it has violated the terms of the contract and because courts define abuse of discretion as acting in bad faith.
Once the Fought trial court found that the pre-existing condition provision in the policy was ambiguous, because the definition
of "pre-existing condition" did not clearly define all of the parameters of what is included within the definition of pre-existing condition, the court merely had to look and see that UNUM denied the
claim based upon its interpretation of the policy language in its
own favor. Even if UNUM's interpretation of the policy language
was reasonable, if the plain language of the policy did not declare
the winner, then the insurer had to apply the insured's reasonable
interpretation of the contract; UNUM's failure to comply with
180. The District Judge apparently did not discuss the rule of contra proferentum in Fought.
181. See id. at 1003-04 ("To say that there is a sliding scale of deference,
however, begs the question: how much less deference ought a reviewing court
afford?"). See also Kennedy, supra note 128.

182. See id. at 1005-07.
183. The savings clause allows the states to indirectly regulate employee
benefits plans by regulating insurance companies that fund the plans. See
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).

184. See note 172, supra.
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state insurance law standards of good faith and fair dealing rendered its claim denial arbitrary and capricious.
One further question arises when a court finds that a plan insurer abused its discretion in denying an ERISA benefits claim because the insurer acted in bad faith. What is the remedy? It appears that a court has three options: 1) the court, applying a
summary judgment standard, could find that the plan participant
is entitled to the benefits as a matter of law; or 2) where questions
of fact need to be resolved, the court could conduct a de novo trial
on the merits, applying the insurance law standards, which are
saved from preemption, to decide anew whether the insurer's decision to deny the claim was correct given the evidence and the controlling law; or 3) according to many ERISA opinions, the court
could "remand" the matter to the plan administrator, directing the
plan administrator to reconsider the claim, taking into account the
state bad faith standards of behavior.1"
Where, upon cross motions for summary judgment, the application of the state insurance law upon admitted facts directs that
the plan participant wins, clearly the court should enter judgment
in favor of the plan participant, as in the hypothetical above.
Where questions of fact prevent a diligent court from finding for
either party as a matter of law, I suggest that courts should conduct a de novo trial to determine the correct outcome, rather than
remanding to the plan administrator for re-consideration." Where
questions of fact prevent a diligent court from finding for either
party as a matter of law, I suggest that courts should conduct a de
novo trial to determine the correct outcome, rather than remanding to the plan administrator for re-consideration. The option of
remand to a plan administrator is procedurally deficient. 187 Additionally, the fear stated by one district judge that a trial court
should not try ERISA benefit cases because it would turn the court
into "a substitute plan administrator" is absurd." The stated fear
that courts may become "substitute plan administrators" displays
a fundamental misunderstanding of ERISA-ERISA plan administrators are not administrative law judges and a plan administrator's internal claims evaluation process is not a substitute for a
governmental agency conducting an administrative trial. Federal
district courts are trial courts, empowered and uniquely situated
to hear evidence and decide facts. When federal district courts refuse to try ERISA cases, they refuse to do their job.
185. See Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers Trust Funds, 382 F.3d 897 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that an order for remand to plan administrator is subject to ap-

peal).
186. See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp., 195 F.3d at 977-80 (discussing that it
is doubtful a federal district court can remand actions to a plan administrator
as if to administrative agencies).
187. See id. See generally DeBofsky, supra note 127.
188. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d at 966.
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As suggested above, courts remand ERISA benefits cases
back to the plan administrator when a court finds that the plan
administrator abused its discretion because courts have treated
ERISA claims as if the plan participant is appealing from an adverse ruling by an administrative law judge, equating the plan
administrator to an original, neutral, fact-finder in a trial below.'
However, ERISA plan administrators are not neutral, and they do
not conduct any type of hearing where plan participants can examine and cross-examine witnesses to expose facts." ERISA expressly provides plan participants a direct federal (or state) court
remedy,' and importantly, the statute nowhere implies that Congress intended plan participants who sue under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) to obtain benefits due under an ERISA plan should
not have all the process afforded by the rules of192civil procedure and
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

V. ERISA DOES NOT BAR STATE INSURANCE LAw ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS URGED BY STATE GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS

VERSUS

ERISA PLAN INSURERS

A. ERISA Does Not Completely Preempt State Insurance
CommissionerEnforcement Actions
The Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, 9 3 as
adopted in most states,'9 grants state Insurance Commissioners
express authority to pursue unfair insurance practice actions
against insurance companies operating within their states, including ERISA plan insurers. Typically, the Insurance Commissioner
can obtain injunctive relief under the state insurance law, and recover fines and penalties. 92
The question of whether ERISA completely preempts enforcement lawsuits brought by state Insurance Commissioners
against ERISA plan insurers was effectively resolved in the first
United States Supreme Court cases to discuss complete preemption in the ERISA context. In FranchiseTax Board v. Construction

189. See, e.g., Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp., 195 F.3d at 975. See also discussion in text accompanying notes 148-149, supra.
190. See DeBofsky, supra note 127, at 738.
191. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(a)(B).
192. See DeBofsky, supra note 127, at 727-28. ERISA's legislative history
shows that Congress considered, and rejected, the idea of establishing an administrative apparatus to hear ERISA benefit claims. See Bogan, supra note
149, at 24 n.14. Congress also rejected a proposal to require arbitration of
ERISA benefit claims. See id.
193. See UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in ASHLEY,
supra note 14, app. III, at appx-25.
194. See ASHLEY, supra note 14, § 9:02.
195. See id. § 5-7.
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Laborers Vacation Trust," the California state agency charged
with responsibility for collecting state taxes issued an order of levy
to obtain assets of delinquent California taxpayers by accessing
the taxpayers' property in the possession of the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California ("CLVT"), an ERISA
plan fiduciary."7 The CLVT obtained an advisory opinion from the
United States Secretary of Labor which declared that ERISA preempted the California garnishment statute at issue.'9
After the CLVT, armed with the advisory opinion, refused to
comply with the garnishment order, the Franchise Tax Board sued
the CLVT in state court to enforce the garnishment order. The
CLVT removed the action to federal court asserting ERISA preemption as a basis for federal court jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court ruled that ERISA did not completely preempt the tax
agency's lawsuit against the ERISA Trust because the action did
not fall within the scope of ERISA section 502. 1' Specifically, the
Supreme Court held that ERISA section 502 did not completely
preempt the Franchise Tax Board's action because the Franchise
Tax Board lacked standing to sue under ERISA's civil enforcement
provision."° Since the Franchise Tax Board was not an entity that
could sue under section 502, the Tax Board's suit did not fall
within the scope of ERISA section 502, and therefore, the federal
courts did not have removal jurisdiction to address the merits of
the Tax Board's assertions, or the CLVT's affirmative defense of
express preemption under ERISA section 514.21 The Court held
that the action must be remanded to state court, where the state
court then had to decide whether ERISA preempted the Tax
Board's enforcement of the state garnishment law under ERISA
section 514.20' The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on how
the state courts should resolve the section 514 question.
196. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
197. See id. at 3-5. Because union tradesmen constantly move from job to
job, the state's usual process of garnishing a delinquent taxpayer's wages to

collect past due state taxes did not provide the tax authority with a viable option to collect taxes against individual union workers. See id. at 5 n.2.

198. See id. at 7 n.4.
199. See id. at 25-26. The federal district court had ruled that it had jurisdiction to decide the matter, but then ruled that ERISA did not preempt the state
law enforcement action. See id. at 7.
200. Id. at 25. Only plan participants and beneficiaries, plan fiduciaries, and

the Secretary of Labor are authorized to sue under ERISA section 502. See
ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
201. FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26-28.
202. In subsequent action in the state court, the state court ruled that the
state garnishment law did not relate to ERISA within the meaning of ERISA
section 514(a), and therefore the tax agency could collect the delinquent taxes

from the Trust. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Vacation Laborers Trust, 204
Cal. App. 3d 955, 965-66 (1988) (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830-31 (1988) (explaining that ERISA does not preempt state general garnishment law).
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The Supreme Court's holding in FranchiseTax Board appears
to resolve the question of whether ERISA completely preempts a
state Insurance Commissioner's action to enforce state insurance
laws against an ERISA plan insurer. Because a state Insurance
Commissioner lacks standing to sue under ERISA section 502, an
unfair insurance practices enforcement action brought by a state
Insurance Commissioner does not fall within the scope of ERISA
sectioi 502, and is not completely preempted by ERISA.
B. State Laws Authorizing State Insurance Commissioner Claims
Versus ERISA Plan Insurers Are Saved from ERISA Preemption
While implementing Franchise Tax Board's holding as applied to an Insurance Commissioner's state-filed unfair insurance
practices action against an ERISA plan insurer, state courts must
still address the insurer's affirmative defense of express preemption, under ERISA section 514. To avoid the state law enforcement
action under ERISA's express preemption provision, an ERISA
plan insurer must establish that the state unfair insurance practices law authorizing an Insurance Commissioner's enforcement
action against an ERISA plan insurer "relates to" an ERISA plan
and does not regulate insurance. While the Supreme Court's Travelers opinion in 1995 significantly narrowed the express "relates
to" test for preemption under ERISA section 514, a state court
might very well hold that a state's unfair insurance practices statute, as applied against an ERISA plan insurer in an Insurance
Commissioner enforcement action, relates to an ERISA plan because enforcement of the state law will substantially impact the
ERISA plan's benefit claims settlement practices. However, even if
the state unfair insurance practices statute relates to an insured
plan under ERISA section 514, an Insurance Commissioner's enforcement action under the state law should be saved from ERISA
preemption under ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) because the state
remedy law regulates insurance.
Applying the KHAP test to state laws that authorize the state
Commissioner of Insurance to enforce state insurance laws against
ERISA plan insurers, it seems unquestionable that such state
laws target the insurance industry, and that they substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. The first prong of the test is obvious-state laws that expressly apply only to insurance companies target the insurance
industry. Additionally, under the second prong of the KAHP test,
Insurance Commissioner enforcement actions under state unfair
insurance practices statutes affect the risk pooling arrangement
between the insurer and the insured because the laws dictate the
standards of behavior insurers must comply with in their benefit
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C. ERISA Section 502 Does Not Impliedly Preempt State
Insurance Commissioner Claims Versus ERISA Plan Insurers
The final question that a state court must resolve in an Insurance Commissioner's suit for injunctive relief, plus fines and
penalties against an ERISA plan insurer is whether ERISA impliedly preempts the state insurance law remedy sought by the Insurance Commissioner under ERISA section 502. As we have seen
in Davila, the Supreme Court has held that ERISA impliedly preempts an individual plan participant's state law remedies that fall
within the scope of ERISA section 502, even if the remedies law
would otherwise be saved from preemption under ERISA section
514. Further, Justice Thomas' opinion in Davila indicates that
ERISA preempts all state law remedies within the field of state
laws remedies that fall within the scope of ERISA section 502, not
just remedies that directly conflict with or duplicate the ERISA
section 502 remedies.2 °4 However, we have also seen that in 1983,
the Supreme Court specifically held that actions by a state agency
to enforce state laws against an ERISA plan are not impliedly preempted under ERISA section 502, at least for purposes of complete
preemption jurisdiction analysis, because the state agent lacks
standing to sue under ERISA section 502. Is the test for assessing
implied preemption under ERISA section 502 the same when a
plan or plan administrator asserts implied preemption of state law
remedies as an affirmative defense, as it is when utilized to assess
complete preemption jurisdiction?
In the complete preemption context, an Insurance Commissioner's enforcement action does fall within the scope of ERISA
section 502 because the state agent lacks standing; however, in
the Franchise Tax Board litigation, on remand to state court, the
Franchise Tax Board's standing and jurisdiction were no longer at
issue. In an Insurance Commissioner's state unfair insurance
practices action, the plan insurer will likely assert that ERISA
impliedly preempts the Insurance Commissioner's claim due to the
contention that Congress intended ERISA to supply the exclusive
remedies arising from ERISA plan. Unfortunately, in Davila, the
Supreme Court failed to define the boundaries of the field wherein
ERISA's remedies act exclusively. Is it the field of all state law
remedies that "relate to" an ERISA plan, as suggested in ERISA
section 514(a) (the preemption clause)? If so, are not state law
remedies that regulate insurance expressly excluded from that
field under ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) (the savings clause)? Is it
the field of all state law remedies that fall within the scope of
203. See discussion in text accompanying notes 59-65, supra.
204. See discussion in text accompanying notes 93-114, supra.
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ERISA section 502? If so, presumably, a state agency's enforcement action under state law against an ERISA plan insurer is not
preempted because Franchise Tax Board teaches that actions by
parties who lack standing to sue under ERISA section 502 do not
fall within the scope of ERISA section 502.205
Absent some clear authority overruling FranchiseTax Board,
that opinion provides the best directive on how to assess implied
preemption of an Insurance Commissioner's state law enforcement
action under ERISA section 502. Franchise Tax Board held that a
state agency's enforcement action against an ERISA plan does not
fall within the scope of ERISA section 502. Further, in Franchise
Tax Board, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not intend
ERISA's remedies provision to provide the exclusive remedies arising from an ERISA plan, because ERISA's savings clause works to
limit the field of state laws impliedly preempted under ERISA section 502.2 Franchise Tax Board instructs that an Insurance
Commissioner's state law action against an ERISA plan insurer to
enforce a state's unfair insurance practices act is not impliedly
preempted by ERISA section 502.
VI. STATE LAWS THAT PROHIBIT GRANTS OF DISCRETIONARY
POWERS IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS WILL RESTORE DE Novo
REVIEW IN PLAN PARTICIPANT INSURANCE CLAIMS

Along with the preemption of state consumer protection laws,
consumer advocates condemn the application of a deferential
standard of review in ERISA insurance claims litigation as the
most destructive processes resulting from ERISA's intrusion into
the traditionally state-regulated fields of health law and insurance
law.0 7 As suggested above, state government action may be required to curb unfair insurer claims practices, because the Davila
decision indicates that ERISA preempts individual plan participant common law bad faith and statutory unfair insurance practices claims. Similarly, it appears that official state action will be
necessary to limit application of the abusive deferential review

205. See supra text accompanying notes 196-202 (discussing standing to sue
under ERISA).
206. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25; Bogan, Savings Clause, supra
note 8, at 110-11. See generally Karen A. Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA
Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65 MO. L. REV. 405, 435-43

(2000).
207. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Plension rights are too important these days for
most employees to want to place them at the mercy of a biased tribunal subject only to a narrow form of 'arbitrary and capricious' review, relying on the
company's interest in its reputation to prevent it from acting on its bias."). See
generally Bogan, ProtectingPatientRights, supra note 8, at 952-53; DeBofsky,
supra note 127, at 728-29.
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standard to self-funded ERISA plans."8 While at least one state
Insurance Commissioner has already attempted to prohibit grants
10
2
of discretionary powers in their insurance policies, " the NAIC
recently took action that will likely encourage more states to pursue similar consumer protections.
In 2002, the NAIC began efforts to propose a model insurance
law that would prohibit insurance companies from including
grants of discretion authorizing the insurer to interpret the terms
of insurance policies or to alter historic state law standards for
courts reviewing claims arising from the denial of insurance benefits. After a two-year period of soliciting comments and weighing
testimony, the NAIC recently approved the Model Act for distribution and recommendation to the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and several U.S. Territories."
States that decide to enact this NAIC Model Act #42, known
as the Discretionary Clause Prohibition Act, will significantly assist ERISA plan participants in gaining an equal legal footing with
ERISA plan insurers in disputes arising from insured ERISA
benefit plans. ERISA courts should find that the Discretionary
Clause Prohibition Act is saved from ERISA preemption as a law
that regulates insurance. Under the first factor of the KAHP savings clause test, the NAIC Act regulates insurance because the
Model Act only applies to health insurers and health insurance
policies, and to disability insurers and disability insurance policies. 12 Additionally, applying the second KAHP factor, the Discretionary Clause Prohibition Act will substantially affect the risk
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured by adding a mandatory contract term to health and disability insurance
policies contained in ERISA plan insurance policies.2"2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's application of express preemption, implied preemption, and complete preemption in ERISA benefit
claims prevents ERISA plan participants from pursuing individual
208. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61 (explaining that state laws

that regulate insurance within the meaning of ERISA savings clause do not
apply to self-funded employee benefit plans because states cannot deem selffunded plans to be insurance companies).
209. See Firestone v. Acuson Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 326 F. Supp.
2d 1040, 1049-51 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

210. The NAIC, formed in 1871, is a voluntary organization of the states
(plus Washington, D.C. and various U.S. territories) chief insurance regulatory officials. For more information on the NAIC, see its website, at
http://www.naic.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
211. See PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT

(NAIC 2002).

212. See id. § 4.
213. See discussion in text accompanying notes 59-65, supra.
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state law extra-contractual remedies in damage claims arising
from ERISA employee benefit plans. Additionally, the summary
adjudication process applied in ERISA claims litigation under the
pretext of trust law and the trust law-based deferential standard
of review has also served to emasculate plan participants in their
attempts to recover even their contract damages arising from
ERISA benefit plans. While historically our justice system has encouraged individuals to protect themselves from wrongdoing by offering individuals the opportunity to present their own claims in
courts and before juries, ERISA has put a heavy thumb on the
scales of justice in favor of ERISA plans, plan insurers and plan
sponsors. Absent individual rights, consumers must turn to their
state officials to seek justice on their behalf. Consumers will now
look to their state Insurance Commissioners to hold insurers accountable for abusive claims settlement practices, as authorized
under most states insurance laws. It is unlikely that such state officials will have sufficient staff to pursue each claim of allegation
of wrongdoing leveled against ERISA plan insurers, however, recent concerted government action against the UNUM/Provident
companies suggests that governmental officials will respond when
complaints become voluminous. 14 Similarly, consumers will now
look to their state governments to implement a new state insurance law, as proposed by the NAIC, that will prohibit insurers
from including discretionary clauses in health and disability insurance polices. It appears that state government regulation will
be the best consumer protection against abusive practices arising
from insured ERISA employee benefit plans. Following Davila, official government action appears to be the most likely avenue to
restore equilibrium in the ERISA benefit claim process.

214. See Report of the Targeted Multistate Market Conduct Examination of

UNUM Life Insurance Company, available at http://www.state.me.us
pfr/ins/UnumMultistateExamReport.htm

(last updated Nov. 17, 2004).

